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Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to widespread concern,' Congress in 1970 passed
the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) to attack the problems
arising from the growing influence of organized crime in America. 2
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chap-
ter of OCCA (Title IX)3 created a new substantive vehicle to reach
racketeering activity and provided for both civil and criminal reme-
dies, including criminal forfeiture. 4 In Russello v. United States ,5 the
Supreme Court resolved a split of authority in the courts of appeals6
by holding that profits and proceeds derived from racketeering ac-
tivity constitute "interests" within the meaning of the RICO crimi-
nal forfeiture provision 7 and, therefore, are subject to forfeiture. 8
1 See infra notes 92, 167-71 and accompanying text.
2 Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941. Three titles in the OCCA
created substantive offenses: Title VIII (illegal gambling operations), Title IX (racke-
teering), and Title XI (importation, distribution, and storage of explosive materials). See
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981).
3 Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982) (effective date Oct. 15, 1970).
4 See infra notes 7 & 15 for the text of RICO's relevant provisions.
5 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983).
6 Compare United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 953 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(holding proceeds to be included in forfeiture), aff'd sub nom. Russello v. United States,
104 S. Ct. 296 (1983), with United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 283 (7th Cir.
1983), and United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding proceeds not included).
7 Section 1963 of RICO provides:
§ 1963. Criminal penalties
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both,
and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained
in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any
enterprise which he has established[,] operated, controlled, conducted, or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the accept-
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The Court's expansive construction of RICO's forfeiture mech-
anism in Russello is consistent with both the ordinary meaning of
"interest" in the statutory language, and the intent of Congress as
reflected in RICO's legislative history. The Russello Court's ap-
proach preserves the effectiveness of RICO's forfeiture sanction
while harmonizing the RICO statute's various parts. The decision
will require lower courts to address a number of related issues in-
volved in the application of the RICO forfeiture provision, such as
what other types of property may constitute forfeitable "interests,"
the effect of greater potential criminal liability on existing proce-
dural protections, the role of traditional restitutionary principles
with respect to property subject to forfeiture, and the use of precon-
viction provisional equitable remedies.
II. FACTS
OnJune 8, 1977, petitioner Joseph C. Russello and twenty-two
others were indicted on charges of RICO conspiracy, RICO sub-
stantive violations, and mail fraud.9 The eighty-three page, thirty-
five count indictment alleged the existence of a widespread arson
insurance fraud scheme, specifying sixty-nine overt acts and fifty-six
predicate acts of racketeering activity. 10 The ring allegedly involved
an insurance adjuster, a money lender, a real estate broker, arson
"torches," and property owners,"i and its activities allegedly re-
ance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other
interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize
the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under
this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. If a
property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the
United States, it shall expire, and shall not revert to the convicted person. All provi-
sions of law relating to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale
thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs
laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in
respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have
been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the col-
lector of customs or any other person with respect to the disposition of property
under the customs laws shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney Gen-
eral. The United States shall dispose of all such property as soon as commercially
feasible, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
8 104 S. Ct. at 300.
9 United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 378 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2020 (1982), vacated in part, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (vacating only as to
forfeiture issue), aff'd sub nom. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983). See also
Joint Appendix at 5-50, Russello (indictment redacted to counts relating to defendant
Russello) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix, Indictment].
10 Martino, 648 F.2d at 378-79.
11 Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 9-12.
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sulted in the destruction of at least eighteen residential and com-
mercial properties in Tampa and Miami, Florida during a three-year
period.' 2 After a fifty-two day trial in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, and after twenty days of
deliberation,13 a jury brought back a total of eighty convictions
against Petitioner and fifteen of his co-defendants.' 4
Petitioner Russello was convicted of conspiracy to commit
RICO violations,1 5 participation in RICO violations, 16 and mail
12 Martino, 681 F.2d at 953. For a detailed description of the properties and their
respective roles in the alleged arson scheme, see Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note
9, at 13-26.
13 Joint Appendix at 1-4, Russello (docket entries). The complexity of the case also is
reflected in the supplemental record at the appellate court level, which included eight
volumes of pleadings, five boxes of exhibits, and the testimony of over two hundred
witnesses contained in nearly one hundred volumes, comprising over 11,000 pages of
material. Martino, 648 F.2d at 379. The Supreme Court, in turn, received four boxes of
materials containing the certified original record and appellate court proceedings.
Docket Sheet in the Supreme Court, entry no. 13 (Mar. 31, 1983), Russello.
14 Martino, 648 F.2d at 378. Three other defendants pleaded guilty. Id. The jury
found four defendants not guilty. Id.
15 RICO conspiracy is declared unlawful in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982). Section
1962 as a whole provides:
§ 1962. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for the purposes of investment, and with-
out the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securi-
ties of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and
his or their accomplices in any pattern or [sic: of] racketeering activity or the collec-
tion of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in
law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any en-
terprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). The lower court discussed the requirements for a RICO con-
spiracy conviction:
To convict on a charge of conspiracy, the government must prove that the de-
fendant had knowledge of the conspiracy and that he intended to join in the objec-
tives of the conspiracy. The degree of criminal intent necessary for participation in
a conspiracy must be at least equal to that required for the substantive offense it-
self. . . . More specifically, to convict for conspiracy to violate RICO the govern-
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ment must prove that the person objectively manifested, through words or actions,
an agreement to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through
the commission of two or more predicate crimes.
Martino, 648 F.2d at 394 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). At least one com-
mentator has criticized this formulation of RICO's conspiracy requirements and Mar-
tino 's language in particular. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 296 n.151 (1982). Professor Blakey
was Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
United States Senate in 1969-70, when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was
processed; he takes issue with Martino's interjection of a "two personal act" rule into the
RICO conspiracy framework. Id. at 296-97 n.151. He claims that such a rule is not
justified by reference to the text of RICO or its legislative history and runs counter to
general principles of conspiratorial liability and the goals of RICO. Id. The two per-
sonal act rule requires that a person agree to participate in at least two predicate acts in
order to be held liable on RICO conspiracy grounds. Id. Circuits that have adopted this
rule have expressed concern over the possible "guilt by association" implications of a
lesser standard. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981).
Professor Blakey contends that "[t]he defendant's role in the enterprise, not specific
individual offenses he agrees to commit, ought to suffice for RICO liability." Blakey,
supra, at 297 n.151 (citation omitted).
Although Congress' main targets in enacting RICO were members of organized
crime, see infra note 168, legislation attacking "organized crime" required a focus on
specific illegal conduct perpetrated by such members, i.e., the commission of two or
more crimes that form a pattern of racketeering activity, and not simply their status as
known "organized criminals." See Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture
in Perspective, 1981 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 225, 228 n.13. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666 (1962) (state cannot constitutionally punish mere status of being a drug ad-
dict). RICO therefore introduced several new concepts to the criminal law. See infra
note 124 and accompanying text. RICO's definitional section clarifies some of its key
terms:
§ 1961. Definitions
As used in this chapter-
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kid-
naping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the follow-
ing provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery),
section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to
counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act
indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement
from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit
transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local
law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery,
or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to in-
terstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlaw-
ful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation
of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband ciga-
rettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indicta-
ble under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on
payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzle-
ment from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case
under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importa-
tion, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;
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fraud.17 Russello had owned and insured the Central Professional
Building in Tampa, Florida before the advent of the arson ring.18
He later arranged for two arsonists to set fire to the front portion of
his building, intending to use the proceeds to rebuild that section,
which was less profitable than the newer rear portion of the build-
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). One key definition not included in RICO, the absence of
which in part generated the case that is the subject of this Note, is that of "interest." See
Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299.
16 Specifically, Russello was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). For the
text of Secton 1962, see supra note 15. The panel opinion at the court of appeals level
identified the essential components for a conviction under Section 1962(c):
Five necessary elements comprise a substantive RICO charge. The govern-
ment must prove (1) the existence of the enterprise; (2) that the enterprise affected
interstate commerce; (3) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the
enterprise; (4) that he participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise;
and (5) that he participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Martino, 648 F.2d at 394. The "enterprise" in Russello was characterized as an "associ-
ated in fact" enterprise as defined in Section 1961(4). 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). See
supra note 15 (§ 1961 text). The Supreme Court, in a later case, legitimized such an
interpretation of RICO's "enterprise" language. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 580 (1981) (holding that the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises). The "patterns of racketeering activity" that arise
under RICO "may be grouped into four, broad, but not mutually exclusive categories:
(1) violence; (2) provision of illegal goods and services; (3) corruption in the labor
movement or among public officials; and (4) commercial and other forms of fraud."
Blakey, supra note 15, at 300-06 (footnotes omitted).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Section 1341 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice
or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service,
or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon . . . shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. In simple terms, "'[t]he two basic elements of a mail fraud scheme are (1) the
scheme to defraud, and (2) causing a mailing for the purpose of executing the
scheme.'" Martino, 648 F.2d at 394 (quoting United States v. Green, 494 F.2d 820, 823
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974)).
18 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Russello. Russello had obtained fire insurance in the
amount of $925,000 on the building and $7500 on the contents. Joint Appendix, Indict-
ment, supra note 9, at 48.
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ing.' 9 After the fire, Russello collected $340,043.09 in insurance
proceeds. 20 He paid the insurance adjuster, another member of the
arson ring, $30,000 for his assistance in obtaining the highest possi-
ble payment. 2 1
Upon submission to the jury of a special verdict regarding the
extent of the interest subject to forfeiture, 2 2 the jury found insur-
ance money received by four defendants in various insurance fraud
schemes, including the proceeds received by Russello, to be subject
to forfeiture to the government. 23 The trial court subsequently is-
sued an order of forfeiture as to the four defendants, 24 and meted
out other penalties. 25 Russello appealed.2 6
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, 27 a three-judge panel affirmed
the convictions of Russello, as well as those of a majority of the
other convicted defendants. 28 The appellate panel, however, re-
19 Brief for the United States at 3, Russello. The fire spread, however, endangering
the lives of several tenants. Id.
20 Id. at 3-4.
21 Id.
22 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a special verdict in certain cases.
Rule 31 states:
If the indictment or the information alleges that an interest or property is subject to
criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest
or property subject to forfeiture, if any.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e).
23 Martino, 681 F.2d at 953. Russello's forfeiture amounted to $340,043.09. The
other three defendants forfeited $4000, $2500, and $4,266.83, respectively. Id.; Joint
Appendix at 54-57, Russello (special verdicts finding four insurance payments to Rus-
sello to be interests forfeited to the United States, Feb. 28, 1978). The government had
sought the forfeiture of a total of $508,492.69, consisting of nineteen insurance pay-
ments from the various defendants under RICO's criminal forfeiture provision. Joint
Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 37-47.
24 Joint Appendix at 58-60, Russello (Order and Judgment of Forfeiture, Nov. 17,
1978). The government initially had sought to have Russello's ownership interest and
property rights in both the corporation and the real property involved in the violations
forfeited as "source[s] of influence" over the RICO enterprise (§ 1963(a)(2)), in addi-
tion to seeking forfeiture of the insurance proceeds. Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra
note 9, at 46. The trial court, however, granted an acquittal as to the forfeiture of Rus-
sello's interests in the corporation and the real property. Brief for Petitioner at 28,
Russello.
25 Martino, 648 F.2d at 379 n.1 (setting out sentences for various defendants). The
trial court sentenced Russello to a total of two ten-year terms for the RICO violations
(§ 1962(d) conspiracy and § 1962(c) substantive) and a total of two five-year terms for
the mail fraud violations (two), all to run concurrently. Id.; Joint Appendix at 51-53,
Russello (Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order, Apr. 7, 1978).
26 Joint Appendix at 61, Russello (Notice of Appeal, Nov. 27, 1978).
27 This court has since become a part of the new United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980) (effective date Oct. 1, 1981).
28 United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 406 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2020 (1982), vacated in part, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (vacating only as to
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versed the district court's order of forfeiture of insurance pro-
ceeds.2 9 This portion of the panel opinion was later vacated
pending an en banc rehearing on the issue.30 The appellate panel
characterized the question of whether the term "interest" in RICO's
criminal forfeiture provision, Section 1963(a), includes income or
receipts from racketeering activity as one of first impression in the
Fifth Circuit.3 ' Relying primarily on the district court decisions in
United States v. Meyers 32 and United States v. Thevis ,3 and the Ninth
forfeiture issue), aff'd sub nom Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983). The
appellate court, per CircuitJudge Politz, rejected several attacks by defendants on their
convictions and on RICO itself. Various appellants challenged the constitutionality of
RICO (on, inter alia, associational, vagueness, ex post facto, and tenth amendment
grounds); attacked the indictment (on sufficiency, duplicity, and misapplication of RICO
grounds); asserted double jeopardy problems (because of prosecution of defendants on
both RICO conspiracy and substantive violations); appealed a number of pretrial mat-
ters; urged reversible error in not severing trials; claimed several trial errors (including
both prosecutorial and defense counsel misconduct); questioned the sufficiency of the
evidence on both the RICO and mail fraud charges; and claimed new evidence had been
discovered. Id. at 380-407. (For a criticism of the Martino panel opinion's formulation
of RICO's conspiracy requirements, see supra note 15.) With regard to Russello, the
court of appeals found Russello's association with both the arsonist and the insurance
adjuster to support adequately the inference of his association with the enterprise, de-
spite his denial of any knowledge of the enterprise as charged in the case. Martino, 648
F.2d at 405-06. The court also rejected Russello's contention that his two mail fraud
convictions did not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity because they were based
on a single scheme that resulted in two convictions because there happened to be two
mailings, as well as his claim that his mail fraud convictions were based not on the
charge specified in the indictment of falsely disavowing knowledge of who started the
fire, but on his exaggeration of the building's value on the claim. Id.
29 Joint Appendix at 62, 68 (Martino panel opinion redacted to deleted forfeiture
issue discussion) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on
forfeiture].
30 The Martino panel opinion's discussion of the forfeiture issue was vacated and
deleted from publication in the reporters after the Fifth Circuit granted an en banc re-
hearing. See Martino, 648 F.2d at 407-09. The panel court's discussion can be found in
full in the advance sheets, slip op. at 8274-76 (5th Cir. June 19, 1981), and is repro-
duced in the Joint Appendix in Russello. Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on for-
feiture, supra note 29, at 62-69.
31 Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 64.
32 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1977). The district court in Meyers denied a motion to
quash an entire indictment because although the government had failed to specify the
extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture as required by Rule 7(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, there were no longer any properly forfeitable in-
terests still in existence because the government had conceded that the evidence did not
establish any participation in the enterprise by the defendant for at least five years' time.
Id. at 461. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) ("When an offense charged may result in a
criminal forfeiture, the indictment ... shall allege the extent of the interest or property
subject to forfeiture.").
The Meyers court discussed the definition of "interest" under § 1963, explaining
that "the more natural interpretation is that an 'interest' is akin to a continuing proprie-
tary right in the nature of partnership or stock ownership (or holding a debt or claim, as
distinguished from 'equity' investment) rather than mere dividends or distributed prof-
1984] 899
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Circuit's decision in United States v. Marubeni America Corp. ,34 the
Fifth Circuit panel held that forfeiture permitted by the statute ex-
tended only to interests "in an enterprise," and not to the fruits or
proceeds of an illegal RICO enterprise. 35 The panel presumed a
congressional intent to "strictly limit" the forfeitures permitted
under Section 1963 because of their in personam character.36 The
its." 432 F. Supp. at 461 (footnote omitted). The Meyers district court contrasted
RICO's forfeiture provision with the forfeiture provision embodied in the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which by its terms specifically applies to
"profits," as support for a restricted reading of RICO's forfeiture language. Id. at n. 18.
See 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982) (Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1265).
33 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The district court in Thevis held that
§ 1963(a)(1) is limited to interests in the enterprise acquired or maintained in violation
of § 1962 as part of its finding that RICO is neither unconstitutionally vague nor uncon-
stitutionally ambiguous. Id. at 142. The court relied on, inter alia, the language of the
Meyers court. Id. The Thevis court did posit, however, that forfeitable interests in the
enterprise could exist even in the case of associations in fact if property had been "infor-
mal[ly] contribut[ed]" to the association "at the risk of the association's success." Id. at
143.
34 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). The Martino appellate court panel characterized
Marubeni as a "well-reasoned opinion." Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on for-
feiture, supra note 29, at 66. The Ninth Circuit in Marubeni was the first court of appeals
to address the issue of whether profits and proceeds of racketeering activity fell within
the ambit of § 1963(a)(1). A three-judge panel in Marubeni held that § 1963(a)(1) ap-
plied only to interests in an enterprise that have been illegally acquired or maintained
and did not encompass $8.8 million in contract awards obtained as a result of RICO
violations. 611 F.2d at 769. Cf. United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that commercial real estate purchased with profits derived from racketeering
activity is subject to forfeiture), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 390 (1983). Interestingly, the
third judge on the Marubeni panel, a district judge from the Eastern District of Virginia
sitting by designation, also later participated in the Seventh Circuit's three-judge panel
opinion in United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983), which expressly
rejected the en banc Fifth Circuit's decision in Martino in favor of Marubeni's reasoning.
See Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 763; McManigal, 708 F.2d at 278.
The Ninth Circuit in Marubeni, although characterizing the government's position
regarding forfeiture as "attractive," concluded that such an interpretation did "not
square with the statute Congress wrote." 611 F.2d at 766. The government in its mem-
orandum response to Russello's petition for certiorari pointed out that although it had
not been relied upon by the en banc Martino court, there was a factual distinction be-
tween Marubeni and Martino: although the interest sought to be forfeited in Marubeni
involved all monies received under a public contract obtained through bid-rigging, in-
cluding both profits and actual costs of goods and services furnished under that con-
tract, the insurance proceeds forfeited in Martino consisted solely of profit from arson
and fraud. Memorandum for the United States at 4 n.3, Russello. The government ac-
knowledged, however, that Marubeni's reasoning would almost certainly require the
Ninth Circuit to disallow the forfeiture at issue in Martino. Id. For criticism of Marubeni,
see Blakey, supra note 15, at 321 n.178; Weiner, supra note 15, at 241-43; Note, RICO,
Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather than the Statute Itself?, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 777, 783-89 (1980). For support of Marubeni, see Taylor, Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963-RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 387 (1980).
35 Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 66.
36 Id. at 66-67. For a discussion of the distinction between in personam forfeiture and
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appellate panel also rejected as unpersuasive an argument based on
the practical problems that such an interpretation would entail in a
case involving a wholly illegal "enterprise in fact" in which, by defi-
nition, there are no legal interests to forfeit.3 7
Upon petition, the Fifth Circuit ordered an en banc rehearing
and vacated the Martino panel opinion as to the forfeiture issue.38
The full Fifth Circuit, by a vote of 16-7, affirmed the forfeiture judg-
ment entered by the district court.3 9 In reasoning similar to that
later employed by the Supreme Court, the en banc appellate court
looked initially to the language of the statute itself.40 The court of
appeals noted that Section 1963(a)(1) does not on its face limit for-
feitable interests to those in an enterprise, and that RICO offers no
definition of the term "interest." 41 The court then examined the
operation and interrelation of RICO's various parts, 42 concluding,
inter alia, that to read an "enterprise" limitation into Section
1963 (a) (1) would render it mere surplusage and duplicative of Sec-
tion 1963(a)(2). 43
The court next explored RICO's legislative history. The en
in ren forfeiture, as well as a discussion of the significance of RICO's revival of in per-
sonam forfeiture, see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. The court noted that
such in personam forfeitures had previously been prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982),
and pointed to comments supporting limitation of forfeiture to interests in an enterprise
contained in a letter by Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst during legislative
hearings on a predecessor bill. Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture,
supra note 29, at 66-67. For a discussion of the import of the Kleindienst letter, see infra
notes 111-13 and accompanying text. The court also found significant Congress' use of
the more specific term "profits" in a contemporary bill's forfeiture provision. Joint Ap-
pendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 67. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a)(2) (1982) (Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1265).
37 Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 67-68.
Although acknowledging that its holding occasioned problems for associations with no
legal interests, such as the one involved in Martino, the court reasoned that the Depart-
ment of Justice had itself recognized the limitations of forfeiture involving individuals
associated in fact. Id. The Martino panel affirmed the forfeiture of another defendant's
interest in his two companies because it fell "squarely" with § 1963(a)(2)'s language
aimed at "any interest . . . affording a source of influence over" the enterprise. Joint
Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 68. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(2) (1982).
38 Joint Appendix at 73-74, Russello (Order for Rehearing En Banc, Oct. 14, 1981).
39 United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 953 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983).
40 Id. at 954.
41 Id.
42 For a detailed discussion of several approaches to construing the relationship of
88 1962 and 1963, see infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text.
43 Martino, 681 F.2d at 954-56. See supra note 7 for provisions of § 1963. The court
explained further that the district court in United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134
(N.D. Ga. 1979), on which the Martino panel opinion had in part relied, had wrongly
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banc opinion emphasized that Congress had been concerned with
the economic influence wielded by organized crime by virtue of its
ill-gotten gains.44 The Fifth Circuit characterized RICO's forfeiture
provision as a "two-pronged attack on the sources of economic
power which feed the coffers and activities of organized crime...
demand[ing] both divestiture of power over the enterprise itself and
seizure of the income derived from racketeering activities."'45 The
en banc court also took notice, as did the panel opinion, of the
problems presented by associations in fact, which often have noth-
ing to forfeit but ill-gotten proceeds.46 The court found it persua-
sive that the two-part forfeiture provision embodied in Section
1963(a), which contains a provision (Section 1963(a)(1)) that is not
by its language limited to interests "in an enterprise" and another
(Section 1963(a)(2)) that is so limited, developed from a single for-
feiture provision that had been limited to interests in the enter-
prise. 47 Finally, the Fifth Circuit opinion, recognizing that its
holding "squarely conflict[ed]" with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Marubeni America Corp. ,48 dismissed a number ofjusti-
fications cited by that court.49
construed the relationship between RICO's various provisions. Martino, 681 F.2d at 955
nn.14-15.
44 Martino, 681 F.2d at 956-59. See also infra note 171 and accompanying text. The
court, in passing, explained that it did not need to resolve a suggested conflict between
RICO's liberal construction clause and the rule of lenity because absent an ambiguity in
RICO's language, which the court declined to find, neither interpretive aid was called
into operation. 681 F.2d at 956 n.16. For a fuller discussion of both RICO's liberal
construction clause and the rule of lenity, see infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
45 681 F.2d at 957. The court thus rejected an argument that Congress' only rele-
vant objective was divesting the racketeer of his position of power in the offending en-
terprise. Id. at 957 & n.19.
46 Id. at 958. The court commented that it would run contrary to Congress' broad
attack on organized crime "to insulate from forfeiture the sole product of many racke-
teering activities," continuing that such a construction would encourage rather than de-
ter bankruptcy and other schemes yielding largely cash revenues. Id.
47 Id. The opinion rejected as inconclusive the Kleindienst letter relied upon by the
panel opinion, see supra note 36, noting that it had been submitted as a commentary on
an original unitary forfeiture provision with an express enterprise limitation, and that it
had not been put forth as a technical commentary on the scope of the expanded bill. Id.
at 958-59.
48 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
49 Martino, 681 F.2d at 959-60. The Martino court refused to attach the significance
that the Marubeni court had to § 1962(a)'s "1% investment exception." Id. at 960. See
supra note 15 for § 1962(a)'s provisions. The Marubeni court reasoned that "Congress
would not haVe established rules for the investment of racketeering income, enforced by
the penalty of criminal forfeiture, if it intended the government to seize that income
regardless of how it was used." Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 767. The Fifth Circuit in Martino
explained its contrary view that the exception serves only to limit the category of illegal
activities, and "does not immunize from forfeiture the fruits of activities that are made
illegal under other provisions of § 1962." Martino, 681 F.2d at 960. For further discus-
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The Martino court "intimate[d] no views" as to whether there
existed an obligation for the government to trace money proceeds
to their current form before a forfeiture collection. 50 Circuit Judge
Politz, author of the Martino panel opinion and its vacated forfeiture
discussion, dissented with six others on grounds substantially simi-
lar to those expressed in the panel opinion.51 The Supreme Court
thereafter granted certiorari to the Fifth Circuit 52 and heard oral ar-
sion of the "1% investment exception," see infra note 164 and accompanying text. The
Fifth Circuit also rejected Marubeni's reliance on Congress' use of the more specific term
"profits" in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 as
relevant to the RICO's drafters' intent in using the more general term "interest." 681
F.2d at 960.
50 681 F.2d at 960-61. Although the en banc appellate court returned the case to the
district court for a decision on the collectibility of forfeiture orders in the first instance,
the court of appeals observed that commentators had suggested application of tradi-
tional restitution principles in such a case. Id. at 961.
51 Id. at 962 (Politz, J., dissenting). See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
Initially, the dissenting opinion objected to the majority's framing of the issue before the
court, noting that "perhaps the more precise issue at bar" was whether under RICO's
criminal forfeiture scheme, "a moneyjudgment may be rendered against a defendant, in
a sum equal to the amount paid under a fire insurance policy, for a loss occasioned by
arson in a setting violative of RICO." 681 F.2d at 962 (Politz, J., dissenting). Judge
Politz asserted at the outset that society's abhorrence of forfeitures, especially in per-
sonam forfeitures, required that such provisions be "most charily assessed." Id. The
dissent counseled against expanding the term "interest" to include income or profits,
stating that such an expansion is "a matter best left to the legislative branch, for it repre-
sents a significant policy decision." Id. Judge Politz viewed the decisions in Marubeni,
Thevis, and Meyers as persuasive and reiterated a number of his panel opinion justifica-
tions. Id. at 963-65 (Politz, J., dissenting). Further, the opinion, assuming arguendo
that insurance proceeds were properly forfeitable, raised a question as to the propriety
of applying the forfeiture sanction to Russello and one other defendant. Id. at 965
(Politz, J., dissenting). Judge Politz explained that inasmuch as the insurance policies
had been obtained prior to the advent of the RICO arson ring, the insurance proceeds
might be viewed as a "different manifestation of a pre-RICO asset," and therefore not
necessarily the "fruits" of racketeering activity. Id. Finally, the dissent identified a
number of practical difficulties inherent in the majority's holding:
Regardless, these proceeds, based on arson and the payments of which were
induced by fraud, are very likely to be defeasible. One would expect that under the
insurance contract, and controlling state law, the insurer would be entitled to recap-
ture the payments. In that event, what happens to the forfeiture decrees which are
non-asset oriented money judgments, collectible from the defendants and their es-
tates? Assuming recapture by the insurer, or diversion of all or a portion to an
innocent third party such as a mortgage holder, will the United States still have an
enforceable money judgment against the defendant and his estate? Presumably so,
and if that presumption is correct, what about the concept of divestiture of ill-gotten
gains and the separation of the convicted defendant from the fruits of his illegal
labors? Will this matter not in fact resolve into the forfeiture becoming an addi-
tional fine? Did Congress really intend to establish a latent fine with a potential for
exceeding the maximum statutorily stated fine ten-fold, twenty-fold or one hun-
dred-fold?
Id.
52 Russello v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983) (grant of certiorari). Certiorari
was granted on January 10, 1983. Petitioner Russello asserted that a writ of certiorari
was justified because, inter alia, as the Martino decision conflicted with a string of other
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gument 53 on the question of whether the term "interest" as used in
Section 1963 (a)(1) includes income or profits derived from a pattern
of racketeering activity.54
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Black-
mun for a unanimous Court, affirmed the judgment of the en banc
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 55 The Court held that profits
and proceeds derived from racketeering activity constitute "inter-
ests" within the meaning of Section 1963(a)(1) and are therefore
subject to forfeiture. 56
Characterizing the litigation as "yet another case" concerning
RICO,57 the Court initially framed its task as one of "interpretation"
cases, including, petitioner claimed, Marubeni, Thevis, and Meyers, as well as United
States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th
Cir. 1977); and United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 390 (1983). Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals at 6,
16, Russello [hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari]. The government, characteriz-
ing the issue as a "potentially significant question" of "substantial and continuing im-
portance," joined in the prayer that a writ of certiorari be granted to resolve any
conflicts with what it viewed as a "correct" decision in the court below. Memorandum
for the United States at 4-6, Russello; Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 298 n.1.
53 See 34 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4038 (Oct. 12, 1983) (summarizing and excerpting
oral argument in Russello). Argument was heard by the Court on October 5, 1983.
54 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 52, at i (framing question presented). The peti-
tioner viewed the issue as a "purely legal question" independent of the facts elicited at
trial. Id. at 5. The government regarded the issue as focused on the forfeiture of
"uninvested" profits of racketeering activity, thereby distinguishing it from the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
commercial real estate purchased with profits derived from racketeering activity is sub-
ject to forfeiture), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 390 (1983). Memorandum for the United States
at 5 & n.4, Russello.
55 Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 304 (1983), aff'g United States v. Mar-
tino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982).
56 Id. at 300. The Court did, however, allude to possible limits on its decision:
In our ruling today, we recognize that we have not resolved any ambiguity that
might be inherent in the terms "profits" and "proceeds." Our use of those terms is
not intended to suggest a particular means of calculating the precise amount that is
subject to RICO forfeiture in any given case. We hold simply that the "interests"
subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1) are not limited to interests in an enterprise.
Id. at 304 n.3.
57 Id. at 297. For example, the Court had only two years before broadly interpreted
another key term in RICO, "enterprise," to encompass illegitimate enterprises, such as a
series of criminal acts unrelated to a legitimate business operation, as well as legitimate
enterprises, thereby resolving a split in the circuits similar to that encountered in Rus-
sello and eschewing a substantially more restricted reading of the RICO statute. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), rev'g 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980). For an in-
depth analysis of the Turkette decision, see Note, RICO Extended to Apply to Wholly Illegiti-
mate Enterprises: United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981), 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1426 (1981). As to RICO generally, see Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and
the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REv. 837 (1980); Meeker & Dombrink, Crimi-
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of Section 1963(a)(1)'s language that a RICO violator forfeit "any
interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962. '58 The opinion took note of a then-recent decision, United
States v. McManigal,SV that had been handed down after the parties
in Russello had briefed their positions. 60 In McManigal, the Seventh
Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit's Marubeni decision and read
the term "interest" in Section 1963(a)(1) as limited to interests in an
enterprise. 61
The Russello Court, drawing on its earlier decision in United
States v. Turkette ,62 in which the Court had interpreted the term "en-
terprise," began its analysis with the language of the statute: " 'In
determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If
the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordi-
narily be regarded as conclusive."' ".63 In the instant case, Justice
Blackmun wrote for the Court that Russello "definitely" had "ac-
quired" the insurance proceeds "in violation of section 1962," spe-
cifically Section 1962(c).64 If the insurance monies qualified as an
"interest," therefore, they would be forfeitable. 65
Finding no specific definition of the term "interest" in RICO,
nal RICO and Organized Crime: An Analysis of Appellate Litigation, 20 CRIM. L. BuLL. 309
(1984); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
165 (1980); Note, supra note 34; Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An
Analysis of the Confusion in its Application and a Proposal for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441
(1980).
58 104 S. Ct. at 297. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 7 for full text
of § 1963. The Court explained: "The sole issue in this case is whether profits and
proceeds derived from racketeering constitute an 'interest' within the meaning of this
statute and are therefore subject to forfeiture." 104 S. Ct. at 299.
59 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983).
60 Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 298.
61 McManigal, 708 F.2d at 283. The McManigal court noted that the arguments for
and against including profits and proceeds within § 1963(a)(1) had been "exhaustively
explored" by the Marubeni and Martino courts. Id. The Seventh Circuit, however,
opted for Marubeni's reasoning "pending a contrary interpretation by the Supreme
Court." Id. at 287. Certiorari in Russello had been granted by that time. The McMani-
gal court construed § 1963(a)(1) as not reaching legal fees that the defendant had ob-
tained from clients by fraudulently processing property tax assessment cases. Id. at 283.
The district court in McManigal had ordered forfeiture of defendant's forty percent in-
terest in $249,250 in legal fees, or $99,700. Id. at 278. The government had also un-
successfully sought forfeiture of the legal fees under (a)(2) as accounts receivable assets
of the law offices relating back to the time of the offense, and therefore an interest in the
enterprise. Id. at 283, 287.
62 452 U.S. 576 (1981). For a discussion of Turkette, see supra note 57.
63 Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (quoting in part Con-
sumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))).
64 Id. For the language of § 1962(c), see supra note 15.
65 104 S. Ct. at 299.
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the opinion looked to the "ordinary meaning" of the word.66 The
Court pointed to several dictionary definitions of "interest" and
suggested that those definitions lead to the conclusion that the "or-
dinary meaning of 'interest' surely encompasses a right to profits or
proceeds." 67 The Court concluded: "It is thus apparent that the
term 'interest' comprehends all forms of real and personal property,
including profits and proceeds." 68
The Court analogized its approach in defining the term "inter-
est" to its previous efforts to define "property" interest for pur-
poses of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 69
Reasoning that Congress undoubtedly did not wish its language in
RICO to be limited by "rigid and technical definitions drawn from
other areas of the law,"' 70 the opinion observed that Congress had
opted to use terms of breadth such as "enterprise," "racketeering
activity," and "participate," as well as "interest." 71 Justice Black-
mun added that Petitioner himself had not attempted to define the
term "interest." 72
Petitioner Russello argued that a relationship exists between
what is subject to forfeiture as a result of racketeering activity and
what constitutes such racketeering activity. 73 Russello contended
that because an "interest" connotes at the least an interest in
"something," Section 1962's listing of RICO violations, and its "en-
terprise" requirement in particular, should be read as delineating
the scope of that "something" and, therefore, as imposing upon
Section 1963 the requirement that the "interest" be in an enter-
66 Id. (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) ("start with the as-
sumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used")).
67 Id. The Court cited definitions appearing in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1178 (1976) ("interest" includes, inter alia, a "good," "benefit," or
"profit"); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979) (includes
"profit." "welfare," or "benefit"); and BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 729 (5th ed. 1979)
("most general term that can be employed to denote a right, claim, title or legal share in
something"). 104 S. Ct. at 299.
68 104 S. Ct. at 299.
69 Id. The Court noted that "property" denotes a broad range of interests.'" Id.
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)). The Court also cited Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982), and Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14,
17-18 (1981). Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299.
70 104 S. Ct. at 299-300. Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (" 'prop-
erty interests' . . . are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, 'property'
denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by 'existing rules or
understandings' ").
71 104 S. Ct. at 300. See supra note 15 (text of §§ 1961, 1962).




prise. 74 The Supreme Court rejected this tack, one that had been
adopted by a number of lower courts, 75 and noted that every prop-
erty interest could be described as an interest in something, even if
only a "possessory interest in currency."' 76 Thus, the Court be-
lieved that it was unnecessary to define the "something" in which a
RICO forfeitable interest is held as the RICO "enterprise."
Having concluded that the statutory language of Section
1963(a)(1) "plainly covers" Russello's insurance proceeds, the
Supreme Court drew support for its finding from RICO's struc-
ture.77 The opinion pointed out that other parts of the RICO stat-
ute contain less expansive language than that appearing in Section
1963(a)(1), such as Section 1963(a)(2)'s "interest in. . . any enter-
prise" phraseology, and that this difference should be presumed in-
tentional: "'[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ",78 Justice Blackmun
opined that had it so intended, Congress would have expressly re-
stricted Section 1963(a)(1) to interests in an enterprise as it had re-
stricted (a)(2).7 9 Justice Blackmun refused "to ascribe this
difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship."8 0
The Court next examined the relationship between Sections
1963(a)(1) and (a)(2). Justice Blackmun's opinion first noted that
the present two-part forfeiture provision, with only one of the sub-
sections limited on its face to interests "in any enterprise," evolved
from a unitary provision that had limited forfeiture to "all interest in
the enterprise." 8' The Court explained that "[w]here Congress in-
cludes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it
prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not
intended. '8 2 The Court's opinion rejected the reasoning of some
lower courts that had found the existence of Subsection (a)(2) to
preclude a broad interpretation of "interest" in (a)(1), and con-
tended that an expansive construction, althugh admittedly allowing
74 Id. For more detailed analysis of the proper relationship between §§ 1962 and
1963, see infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text.
75 See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
76 104 S. Ct. at 300.
77 Id.
78 Id. (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 301. See S. 1861, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); see also infra notes 108-10 and
accompanying text.
82 104 S. Ct. at 301 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 580-81 (1963)).
1984] 907
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
some overlap to occur between the two subsections, did not render
(a)(2) "mere surplusage."' 3 The Court stated that unlike interests
forfeitable under Subsection (a)(1), which must be "acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962," interests forfeitable under
(a)(2) need not necessarily be illegally acquired.8 4 The Court ob-
83 Id.
84 Id. The Court concluded: "Thus, there are things forfeitable under one, but not
the other, of each of the subsections." Id. The Court elaborated in a footnote: "There
may well be factual situations to which both subsections apply. The subsections, how-
ever, are clearly not wholly redundant." Id. at 301 n.2.
Respondent United States posited the same theory to explain the difference be-
tween subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), arguing that a forfeitable interest under subsection
(a)(2) need not be "illegally acquired or maintained." Brief for the United States at 23,
Russello. As an illustration, the government hypothesized a "defendant lawfully ac-
quir[ing] an interest in an enterprise and then conduct[ing] or participat[ing] in the con-
duct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," and concluded
that "his interest in the enterprise would be subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(2)
but not under (a)(1)." Id. The government offered no further explanation with regard
to this example as to why (a)(1) would not apply.
It is not clear, however, that this fact pattern would not be reachable via
§ 1963(a)(1)'s forfeiture mechanism. Query whether a person, taking part in illegal
racketeering conduct as part of an enterprise in which he has an interest, would not also
be illegally "maintain[ing]" that interest, even though the interest was legally acquired,
once the enterprise embarked on a pattern of racketeering activity? To be more specific,
would not the defendant have "maintained" his interest "in violation of section 1962";
in particular violating § 1962(c)'s proscription of conducting or participating in an en-
terprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; maintaining his interest through a
pattern of racketeering activity in violation of § 1962(b); or violating § 1962(d)'s pro-
scription against conspiring to violate § 1962(a), (b), or (c)? If so, such interest would
seem on the face of § 1963(a)(1) to be forfeitable under its "maintained in violation"
language. RICO offers no specific definition of the term "maintained," but "main-
tained" in (a)(1) seemingly means something other than "acquired," and arguably could
have been inserted by RICO's drafters precisely to catch those situations in which an
interest was legitimately acquired but later illegally "maintained," as where that interest
is put to a corrupt use. Indeed, if not this one, what other scenario would the "main-
tained" language in (a)(1) be designed to reach?
Another problem with the Court's, and the government's, interpretation is that it is
also unclear exactly what meaning is to be ascribed to the phrase "in violation of section
1962." In what manner and to what extent, for instance, must the interest that is "main-
tained" be related to the activity declared unlawful by § 1962 in order to be "maintained
in violation of" that section? For that matter, one could raise the same question as to
what comprises the requisite relationship where an interest is found to be "acquired...
in violation of section 1962."
Note that the Supreme Court in Russello, unlike the government in its brief, ne-
glected to include the phrase "or maintained" in its formulation of the distinction be-
tween (a) (1) and (a) (2): "Subsection (a) (2), on the other hand, is restricted to an interest
in an enterprise, but that interest itself need not have been illegally acquired." 104 S. Ct.
at 301 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, when quoting § 1963(a)(1) at that point, the Court,
for no apparent reason, deleted the phrase "or maintained" from the statutory lan-
guage. See id. These omissions may very well be attributable to the fact that Russello's
facts involved an illegal acquiring (insurance proceeds) and not an illegal maintaining.
Perhaps the omissions also were just that, unintentional oversights. On the other hand,
perhaps they reveal the Supreme Court's caution in attempting to state the precise rela-
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served further, as had the lower court,8 5 that a narrow interpretation
"would blunt the effectiveness of the [forfeiture] provision in com-
batting illegitimate enterprises," such as the instant arson ring,
given that such associations in fact rarely possess interests of a for-
feitable nature independent of their members.8 6 The Russello Court
eschewed placing "'[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity'"
beyond the reach of RICO forfeiture.8 7
The Supreme Court dismissed a number of arguments that had
been raised by some lower courts and by petitioner Russello. Jus-
tice Blackmun's opinion rejected Petitioner's contention that Con-
gress' use of the more specific term "profits" in the forfeiture
mechanism of the Controlled Substances Act, passed within a
month of RICO, indicated that RICO's broader language was not
meant to reach profits.88 The Court observed that RICO is targeted
tionship between (a)(1) and (a)(2) in light of the expanded scope given to (a)(1) by the
Court. In oral argument, for example, at least one Justice manifested a concern with the
relationship between § 1963(a)(1) and (a)(2) under the government's interpretation:
Justice O'Connor: Can you give us examples of what would be covered under
§ 1963(a)(2) that would not also be covered by § 1963(a)(1)?
Alito [Assistant to the Solicitor General]: Under § 1963(a)(1), the interest must
be acquired and maintained in violation of the statute. Under § 1963(a)(2), the inter-
est needn't have been illegally obtained. Actually, § 1963(a)(1) is the less controver-
sial of the two sections.
Justice O'Connor: But can you give us a concrete example?
Alito: If someone had a lawful interest in an enterprise, but later fell on hard
times and began utilizing it for racketeering purposes in violation of RICO,
§ 1963(a)(2) would cover that situation, not § 1963(a)(1). There is considerable
overlap between the two sections, of course.
Justice O'Connor: Clearly differentiate the two.
Alito: Section 1963(a)(1) covers any interests...
Justice O'Connor: Then you don't need § 1963(a)(2).
Alito: No, that's not true. Section 1963(a)(2) covers the situation where the
interest was acquired legally.
34 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4038, 4039 (Oct. 12, 1983) (emphasis supplied) (ellipsis in orig-
inal). In this exchange, government counsel retreated to the unlawful acquisition ele-
ment, variously characterized as an illegal "obtain[ing]," as the distinguishing factor in
his hypothetical, which is essentially the same example relied upon in the government's
brief. He did not address, however, why the interest described would not have been
illegally "maintained," although he acknowledged initially that the term "maintained"
also appears in § 1963(a)(1) (which, incidentally, reads "acquired or maintained," and
not, as framed by the Assistant to the Solicitor General, "acquired and maintained").
The answer to Justice O'Connor's initial query seems, therefore, somewhat opaque. In
any case, given, inter alia, Justice O'Connor's obvious concerns, it seems odd that the
Court characterized as "plainly incorrect" the argument that Subsection (a)(2) may be
rendered redundant by a broad interpretation of (a)(1). See 104 S. Ct. at 301.
85 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
86 104 S. Ct. at 301. The Court previously had held in its Turkette decision that a
RICO "enterprise" encompassed such wholly illegitimate associations in fact, as well as
legitimate enterprises. See supra note 57.
87 104 S. Ct. at 301 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 589).
88 Id. The Court commented:
Language in one statute usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different
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at more economically diverse criminal activity than is the drug legis-
lation, which is aimed at illegal operations generating primarily
monetary profits. 89 The opinion also interpreted later attempts by
some Congressmen to amend and clarify RICO's forfeiture provi-
sion, not as indicative of the limited scope of RICO's language as
written, but as a reaction by some members of Congress to narrow
readings of Section 1963(a)(1) adopted by several lower courts.90
Similarly, the Supreme Court attributed the presence of specific
"profits" and "proceeds" language in later state RICO-type legisla-
tion to an effort by those states to avoid in their courts the narrow
readings of RICO engaged in by earlier lower federal court deci-
sions, rather than to a deficiency in RICO's forfeiture language.9'
The Supreme Court also utilized RICO's legislative history as
further justification for an expansive interpretation of RICO's forfei-
ture provision. The Court drew on Congress' Statement of Find-
ings and Purpose as evidence that "the RICO statute was intended
to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault
upon organized crime and its economic roots." 92 Also of signifi-
language in another statute, even when the two are enacted at or about the same
time. The term "profits" is specific; the term "interest" is general. The use of the
specific in the one statute cannot fairly be read as imposing a limitation upon the
general provision in the other statute.
Id.
89 Id. The opinion explained that although Congress was clearly aware of the differ-
ing terminology employed in the two forfeiture provisions, id. at 301-02, it was
most unlikely. . . that without explanation a potent forfeiture weapon was withheld
from the RICO statute, intended for use in a broad assault on organized crime,
while the same weapon was included in the Controlled Substances Act, meant for
use in only one part of the same struggle. If this was Congress' intent, one would
expect it to have said so in clear and understandable terms.
Id. at 302.
90 Id. at 302. The Court characterized bills such as S. 2320, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), as attempts to legislatively overrule decisions such as Marubeni, Meyers, and The-
vis. 104 S. Ct. at 302. Justice Blackmun added that it was "well settled that ' "the views
of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier
one."' " Id. (quoting Jefferson County Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S. Ct.
1011, 1020 n.27 (1983) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960))).
91 104 S. Ct. at 302.
92 Id. The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose accompanying the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970 provided:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of nar-
cotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business
and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organ-
ized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's eco-
nomic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with
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cance, from the Court's perspective, was RICO's "liberal construc-
tion" clause: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."9 3 The opinion cited
a number of statements from RICO's drafters emphasizing organ-
ized crime's illegal income and economic clout as the focus of an
effective attack.94
The Russello Court discounted contrary readings of RICO's leg-
islative history espoused by some lower courts. Although recogniz-
ing that one of Congress' primary concerns was organized crime's
infiltration of legitimate business, Justice Blackmun's opinion dis-
agreed that the scope of RICO's forfeiture provision should be lim-
ited to fulfillment of only this one legislative purpose.95 The
opinion reasoned that Congress' "broader goal" was to take the
profit out of organized crime by forcing the racketeer to disgorge
his ill-gotten gains; indeed, to fail to reach profits and proceeds
would only encourage "speedy looting of an infiltrated company." 96
Put simply, a forfeiture provision reaching only "an interest of little
worth in a bankrupt shell," 97 and not illegal profits already removed
from an enterprise by its racketeer constituents, would create an in-
centive to quickly bleed as many proceeds from the enterprise as
possible. On grounds resembling those put forth by the en banc
free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the
domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens;
and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gath-
ering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evi-
dence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions and remedies to bear on the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions
and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 at 362 (1982). Cf.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981) (ascribing similar significance to
RICO's Statement of Findings and Purpose in broadly interpreting "enterprise").
93 Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 at 362
(1982). The Court stressed the uniqueness of such a clause: "So far as we have been
made aware, this is the only substantive federal criminal statute that contains such a
directive; a similar provision, however, appears in the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731." 104 S. Ct. at 302. For further discussion of the role of RICO's liberal con-
struction clause, see infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
94 104 S. Ct. at 302-03. See also infra note 171 and accompanying text. The opinion
concluded that "Congress could not have hoped successfully to attack organized crime's
economic roots without reaching racketeering profits." 104 S. Ct. at 303.
95 104 S. Ct. at 303. For a discussion of contrary lower court case law, see infra notes
173-76 and accompanying text.




Fifth Circuit in Martino, the Supreme Court also denied interpretive
weight to a letter by then Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst ad-
dressing the constitutionality of an early forfeiture draft. 98 Finally,
on the grounds that the language of RICO's forfeiture provision was
clear, the Russello Court found inapplicable the rule of lenity, an
interpretive aid sometimes relied upon in cases of statutory ambigu-
ity, which calls for strict construction of penal provisions. 99
In conclusion, the Russello Court expressly declared its disa-
greement with the reasoning of the Marubeni, McManigal, Meyers,
and Thevis courts and affirmed the Fifth Circuit's en banc judgment
in Martino. 100
IV. ANALYSIS
The sharp division in the lower federal courts regarding the
propriety of forfeiture of profits and proceeds under RICO's Sec-
tion 1963(a)(1), as well as the Supreme Court's resolution of the
issue in Russello, provide an opportunity to examine conflicting ap-
proaches to application of the congressional mandate embodied in
RICO. This Section discusses the various attempts to define
RICO's terms; the question of whether RICO should be read
broadly or narrowly; RICO's structural congruity; congressional in-
tent and RICO's legislative history; and potential questions in the
application of the RICO forfeiture mechanism.
A. ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE A RICO "INTEREST"
As the Supreme Court noted at the outset of its Russello opin-
ion, the question of whether Section 1963(a)(1) reaches profits and
proceeds of racketeering activity is essentially one of "interpreta-
tion." 10' The single goal of statutory interpretation ostensibly is the
ascertaining by the reviewing court of the intended meaning of lan-
guage used by a legislature. Nevertheless, the process of statutory
interpretation can produce diverse results, entailing significant
consequences. 102
98 Id. See supra note 47.
99 104 S. Ct. at 303-04. The opinion noted that the rule of lenity " 'comes into oper-
ation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrong-doers.' " Id. at 303
(quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)). Cf. Turkette, 452 U.S. at
588 n. 10 ("There being no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here, the rule of
lenity does not come into play.") (citation omitted). See also supra note 44; infra notes
127-30 and accompanying text.
100 104 S. Ct. at 304.
101 Id. at 297.
102 Disparate conclusions with respect to the question of interpretation raised by this
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One universally recognized principle of interpretation exhorts a
court to look first to the statutory language itself.10 3 The legisla-
ture, however, failed to define "interest" in the RICO statute. Fur-
thermore, RICO seems to employ the undefined term "interest"
inconsistently: Section 1963(a)(2) authorizes the forfeiture of "any
interest in . . . any enterprise"; Subsection, (a)(1), on the other
hand, reaches "any interest. . acquired or maintained in violation
of section 1962," not on its face limiting forfeiture under that sub-
section to interests "in an enterprise." 10 4 When RICO uses the
one RICO provision represent an informative example. Compare, e.g., Russello, 104 S.
Ct. at 300 (statute "plainly covers" proceeds), and Weiner, supra note 15, at 241 (statute
"should obviously extend to money forfeitures"), with, e.g., McManigal, 708 F.2d at 286
(statute "can be reasonably construed" to exclude proceeds), Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 142
(statute is "clear, precise, and defined ...[and not) ambiguous" in its exclusion of
proceeds), and Meyers, 432 F. Supp. at 461 (only a "strained construction" would regard
proceeds as within statute). -
As for the possible consequences of such interpretive exercises, one issue of first
impression raised by the defendants (and rejected) in the Martino panel opinion was that
RICO was unconstitutional as an ex post facto law because ofjudicial enlargement. See
artino, 648 -.2d at .81. Specifically, the defendants claimed that the court had en-
larged RICO by applying RICO to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises (an appli-
cation later approved by the Supreme Court in an unrelated case, Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981)). Martino, 648 F.2d at 381.
The interpretation issue raised by RICO's forfeiture language to some degree
presents the courts with questions of both ambiguity and vagueness. A statute may be
unconstitutionally vague, see Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
(statute is unconstitutional where it is so vague "that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning"), and in particular that vagueness may go to the sanc-
tion to be imposed, see United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 435 (1948). Ambiguity, how-
ever, "exists when it is in fact possible to ascertain one or more alternative meanings.
Vagueness, therefore, means 'no meaning,' while ambiguity means 'more than one
meaning.'" Blakey, supra note 15, at 289 n.150.
103 See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429-31 & n.8 (1981); Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 (1980); United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979); Ianelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786-89 (1975). In the specific context of RICO, the
Supreme Court has expounded at length on a court's proper approach to interpretation:
In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statu-
tory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Of
course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing "plain" or "unam-
biguous" language. Also, authoritative administrative constructions should be
given the deference to which they are entitled, absurd results are to be avoided and
internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate
Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965).
We nevertheless begin with the language of the statute.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580. The Court added that the statutory language represents "the
most reliable evidence of its [Congress'] intent." Id. at 593.
104 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). At the same time, neither does § 1963(a)(1) by its terms
expressly include profits or proceeds.
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word "interest" in sections other than 1963(a)(1), express language
limits the term to interests "in any enterprise." 10 5 Unless one con-
siders the omission of limiting language in Section 1963(a)(1) to
have been purposeful, no reason, other than a simple mistake in
drafting, seems to exist to explain the dissimilar phrasing.10 6 The
Russello Court, rightly it appears, refused to attribute the differing
language to mistake, but presumed the omission to be
intentional. 10 7
105 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (authorizing forfeiture of "any interest in . . .any en-
terprise"); § 1962(b) (making it unlawful through a pattern of racketeering activity to
acquire or maintain "any interest in ...any enterprise"); § 1964(a) (conferring juris-
diction on district courts to divest defendant of "any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise").
106 This argument was espoused by the government in Russello. See Brief for the
United States at 21-22, Russello.
It might be possible to base an argument against inclusion of proceeds in (a) (1) on
an ejusdem generis type of analysis. Ejusdm generis is a principle of statutory construction
suggesting that more general terms in a series are limited, by more specific words in that
series, to things similar to those specifically enumerated. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973). Strictly speaking, this principle does
not fully apply in the context of RICO's forfeiture section because that section does not
involve words in a series, but rather involves phrases within a single provision. Never-
theless, the argument might be advanced that despite the omission in (a)(1)-the more
general phrase-of the words "in any enterprise," the presence of those words in
(a)(2)-the more specific phrase-impels a restricted, more specific reading of (a)(1) as
well.
The contention, however, does not seem persuasive. Initially, § 1963(a) is not a
series; it contains only two parts, each presumably having an equal role in the statutory
forfeiture scheme. Moreover, the ejusdem generis approach is at odds with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Turkette. In Turkette, the First Circuit had relied on e'usdem generis to
restrict the term "enterprise" to mean "legitimate enterprise." See United States v.
Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The court of
appeals reasoned that because each of the specific enterprises enumerated in § 1961(4)
was a legitimate enterprise, the final phrase, "any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact," also should be limited to legitimate enterprises. Id. ; see supra note 15 (text
§ 1961). The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected this view. United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981). The Turkette Court characterized the rule of ejusdem
generis as "no more than an aid to construction ...[that] comes into play only when
there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute." Id.
(citation omitted). Further after dividing the § 1961(4) definitional provision into two
groups of enterprises, legitimate ones and ones associated in fact, the Court refused to
regard one category as a more generalized description of the other, insisting that both
were separate classifications. Id. at 581-82. The Court noted that within the second
category standing alone, there existed no specific enumeration followed by a general
description. Id. at 582. Therefore, e'usdem generis could not be applied. Id. Similarly,
RICO's forfeiture provision not only establishes two categories by its language, but ex-
plicitly divides these two categories by separating § 1963(a) into (a)(1) and (a)(2). Using
the Turkette Court's logic, there exists in subsection (a)(1)-analogous to the second
category in Turkette-no specific enumeration followed by a more general description on
which to predicate a case for application of ejusdem generis.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80. The presumption that Congress omitted
"in any enterprise" intentionally is consistent with the Court's approach in Turkette,
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The debate over RICO's forfeiture language centers not only
on the differences between the two subsections of Section 1963(a),
but also on the differences between the language of Section 1963(a)
as it now reads and the language of predecessor bills. An earlier
draft of RICO, Senate Bill 1861, contained a single forfeiture provi-
sion limited to "all interest in the enterprise."' 108 After revision by
the Judiciary Committee, however, the current two-part version, em-
bodied in Section 1963(a)(1) and (a)(2), emerged.' 0 9 Courts favor-
ing forfeiture of profits and proceeds have pointed to this revision
as indicative of Congress' intent not to limit (a) (1) to interests "in an
enterprise." 10
Of some importance as background to these legislative rework-
ings is a letter from then Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to
Congress that conveyed the Justice Department's view of the consti-
tutionality of Senate Bill 1861, a RICO forerunner:
It is felt that this revival of the concept of forfeiture as a criminal pen-
alty, limited as it is in Section 1963(a) to one's interest in the enterprise which
is the subject of the specific offense involved here, and not extending
to any other property of the convicted offender, is a matter of Con-
gressional wisdom rather than of constitutional power .... "I
Although the Kleindienst letter arguably is of some probative
weight, 1 2 the Russello Court was justified in rejecting it as persua-
sive with respect to Section 1963's construction. The Kleindienst
wherein it similarly presumed that Congress intended a broad reach to a RICO "enter-
prise" where the statute did not specify "legitimate" enterprises: "Had Congress not
intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the
definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate.'" Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581. The argu-
ment that Congress "would have said so," however, can cut both ways. See, e.g., Mar-
tino, 681 F.2d at 964 (Politz, J., dissenting) ("If Congress had intended otherwise [than
to limit forfeitures to interests in the enterprise], I am convinced it would have said so
clearly and unequivocally.").
108 S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
109 S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
110 See Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 301; Martino, 681 F.2d at 958; see also Weiner, supra note
15, at 238 & n.49. Weiner, Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Crime Enforce-
ment of the Department ofJustice (DOJ), argues that the change was made only after the
DOJ called the original limitation to the attention of Congress, concluding: "The clear
inference is that this expansion of the scope of the statutory forfeiture provision was
deliberate, reflecting a legislative intention to extend the applicability of the forfeiture
remedy." Weiner, supra note 15, at 238.
111 Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 1861 and Related Proposals
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1969) (letter dated Aug. 11, 1969, from Deputy Attorney General
Richard P. Kleindienst) (emphasis supplied by Congress) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
112 A number of courts have noted, for instance, that the Senate Report on RICO, S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 617],
quoted the letter as an accurate interpretation "aptly explain[ing]" RICO's forfeiture
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letter was intended only as an examination of the constitutionality of
an earlier version of RICO, and in no way constituted an analysis of
Congress' intent in enacting a later different version of the forfei-
ture provision. 31 3
If Section 1963(a)(1) is to be viewed as independent of an "en-
terprise" limitation, whether imposed by Section 1963(a)(2)'s "in
any enterprise" language or by reference to the racketeering activi-
ties barred by Section 1962,114 then some meaning must be ascribed
the term "interest." As already noted,"15 RICO does not define the
term "interest."' 16 The Russello Court appears correct in broadly
mechanism. See McManigal, 708 F.2d at 286; Martino, 681 F.2d at 964 (Politz,J., dissent-
ing); Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 768.
113 See Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 303. The Russello Court explained:
That letter, with its reference to "one's interest in the enterprise" does not indicate,
for us, any congressional intent to preclude forfeiture of racketeering profits. The
reference, indeed, is not to § 1963(a) as finally enacted but to an earlier version in
which forfeiture was to be expressly limited to an interest in an enterprise. The
letter was merely following the language of the then pending bill. Furthermore, the
real purpose of the sentence was not to explain what the statutory provision meant,
but to explain why the Department ofJustice believed it was constitutional.
Id. The Martino court found that "nothing in the [Senate] report suggests that the letter
provides a technical commentary on the scope of each section of the expanded bill."
Martino, 681 F.2d at 959. The government contended that the Kleindienst letter was
included in the Senate Report as relevant because it addressed the constitutionality of a
feature that was retained in the final version, the forfeiture of interests in an enterprise.
See Brief for the United States at 47-48, Russello.
The lower court attributed the letter to Congress' concern over "entering new terri-
tory," especially with respect to the constitutionality of the in personam criminal forfei-
ture sanction. Martino, 681 F.2d at 959. For further discussion of in personam criminal
forfeitures, see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. The government also argued
that it was unreasonable to interpret the letter as implying any constitutional problems
should Congress mandate forfeiture of interests other than those in an enterprise, inas-
much as the objections that had been raised by some Congressmen had assumed that
the authorized forfeiture would extend beyond interests involved in the RICO violation.
Brief for the United States at 46-47, Russello. The government explained that forfeiture
of racketeering profits derived directly from illegal activity was not subject to the same
objection that opponents had erected as to forfeiture of an interest in a legitimate busi-
ness. Id. at 47.
114 The Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's contention in Russello that the substan-
tive prohibitions in § 1962 limited the nature of the interests forfeitable under § 1963.
See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a variety of opinions
on how RICO's provisions interrelate, see infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text.
115 See supra note 15 and text accompanying note 66.
116 Although the term "interest" is not defined in RICO, § 1964(a) does confer juris-
diction on district courts to, inter alia, divest a defendant of "any interest, direct or indi-
rect, in any enterprise," as a civil remedy. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). Section 1964's
language raises its own questions. What do the modifiers "direct or indirect" add to the
meaning of "interest," or "interest in any enterprise"? What constitutes an indirect in-
terest, or an indirect interest in any enterprise? Should "direct or indirect" be read into
the term "interest" when it is used in other RICO provisions? Is it significant that the
"direct or indirect" interest language appears in the civil remedies provision (§ 1964)
and not in the criminal penalties provision (§ 1963)? Compare this adjectival use of
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applying that term. Whether a court looks to dictionary defini-
tions, 117 relevant treatises, 118 or case law from other areas, 119 the
term "interest" ordinarily conveys a comprehensive scope.' 20 Addi-
tionally, as the Supreme Court recognized, RICO employs a
"direct or indirect" to other adverbial uses appearing in RICO: "unlawful for any per-
son who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racke-
teering activity ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of, any enterprise" (§ 1962(a)) (emphasis supplied); "unlawful ... through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise" (§ 1962(b)) (emphasis supplied); "unlawful for any per-
son employed by or associated with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity" (§ 1962(c)) (emphasis supplied). Given RICO's intentionally broad substantive
reach as evidenced by § 1962's repeated refrain of "directly or indirectly," should the
meaning of "any interest, direct or indirect" be given an equally broad interpretation?
Section 1964 provides further that district courts have broad injunctive and equita-
ble powers (§ 1964(a)), that the Attorney General may institute proceedings under the
section (§ 1964(b)), that persons injured in business or property may sue and recover
treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees (§ 1964(c)), and that a final criminal judgment
against a RICO defendant estops the defendant from denying essential allegations of the
criminal offense in subsequent civil proceedings brought by the United States
(§ 1964(d)). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
117 The Supreme Court in Russello cited several dictionary definitions of interest. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit in McManigal had given
dictionary definitions of "interest" a narrower reading, seeing an "interest" as a" 'right,
claim, title, or legal share in something.'" McManigal, 708 F.2d at 284 (quoting BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 729 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis supplied by the court)). The McManigal
court also reasoned that because the terms "interest," "income," and "proceeds" were
all used in § 1962(a), see supra note 15, Congress did not intend them all to possess the
same meaning. 708 F.2d at 284. For a discussion of possible relationships between
§§ 1962 and 1963, see infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text.
118 The government cited a number of treatises on property favoring a broad reading
of the term "interest." See Brief for the United States at 13-14, 18, Russello (citing, inter
alia, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936) ("interest" denotes any "rights, privileges,
powers and immunities" respecting land or other things); id at § 5 comment a ("no
corresponding term in common use" manifests a similar scope)).
119 The Supreme Court in Russello referred to several of its due process decisions in
divining the meaning of "interest." See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
120 Contra United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977). See supra
note 32. See also United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (quot-
ing Meyers); Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 65
(quoting Meyers). The government, noting that neither Meyers nor Thevis had cited au-
thority for the definition of "interest," characterized the Meyers approach as "artificially
narrow." Brief for the United States at 17 n.4, Russello. The government opined that
even if the Meyers court had arrived at one acceptable definition, a court "engaging in
statutory interpretation need not adopt the narrowest possible meaning of a plain and
ordinary word," id. (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 n.10), but should give the words
their" 'fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers,'" id. (quoting
United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948)). Finally, the government contended that
an "interest" need not connote something less than sole ownership, citing a sole propri-
etorship, a fee simple absolute interest in real estate, and ownership of personal prop-
erty, among others, as examples of "interests" entailing sole ownership. Id. at 18.
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number of other broad terms.' 2 '
B. SHOULD RICO BE READ BROADLY OR NARROWLY?
The Russello Court skirted a question that has caused some dis-
agreement among lower courts and that may bear on any exercise in
interpreting RICO's language: whether RICO's criminal provisions
should be read broadly or narrowly. RICO can be read as a sweep-
ing attack on the problem of organized crime, relying on broad ter-
minology to implement that attack. The final version of RICO, the
product of extensive congressional consideration, 22 does not mani-
fest a limited scope. ' 23 The drafters of RICO purposely introduced
new concepts and new substantive offenses that are independent of
traditional areas of federal legislation such as antitrust. 24 The stat-
ute employs broad terms and avoids painstaking enumeration. 25
121 See supra text accompanying note 71; infra note 125 and accompanying text.
122 See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975) (RICO represents a "care-
fully crafted piece of legislation"). Statements by key sponsors reveal the considerable
legislative effort expended in drafting RICO. Senator McClellan, Senate sponsor of
RICO, described debate on the Organized Crime Control Act as "the culmination of a
year of detailed study, hearings, and consultations" and listed an impressive array of
organizations consulted during legislative drafting. 116 CONG. REC. 585 (1970) (state-
ments of Sen. McClellan). Similarly, Representative Poff, House floor manager of
RICO, noted that in his experience, no single measure had "received more thorough
consideration by a legislative committee than this bill." Id. at 35,204 (statements of
Rep. Pofi).
123 See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978) ("Nothing on the face of
• . . [RICO] suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage").
124 The substantive offenses employ at least two concepts new to the federal criminal
law, the "pattern of racketeering activity" and the "enterprise." Taylor, supra note 34,
at 386. Early legislative efforts had explored antitrust theories as possible avenues of
attack on organized crime, focusing on, for example, the use of unreported income from
one line of business in another line of business, investment of proceeds of criminal activ-
ity in a business enterprise, and anticompetitive effects in general. Blakey, supra note
15, at 253-56 & nn.48-53. The Antitrust Law Section of the American Bar Association
specifically recommended that RICO-type legislation be enacted independent of extant
antitrust legislation, such as the Sherman Act, due in part to unnecessary obstacles that
reliance on antitrust jurisprudence might pose. See 115 CONG. REC. 6994-95 (report of
ABA); Blakey, supra note 15, at 254-56 & nn.51-53.
Professor Blakey has asserted that RICO does not resemble a traditional criminal
statute because "its violation depends on the commission of at least two acts that violate
independent criminal statutes; it does not 'draw a line' between innocent and criminal
conduct. . . . That line is drawn by the offenses that constitute the 'racketeering activ-
ity' of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) . I..." d. at 243 n.20 (citations omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal). The novelty of RICO's forfeiture approach was underscored by the Justice
Department's initial deferral in commenting on the provision: "[W]e are in accord with
its objectives. However, because it is so innovative we have been unable to explore all
the ramifications of the proposal .. " Senate Hearings, supra note 111, at 66 (prepared
statement for U.S. Dep't ofJustice).
125 The Russello Court noted the statute's use of terms of breadth other than "inter-
est," including "enterprise," "racketeering activity," and "participate." See supra text
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Finally, the drafters of RICO expressly provided that the legislation
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."' 126 All
accompanying note 71. The government in Russello additionally attempted to examine
the legislative choice of the term "interest" in light of other options:
Congress's only alternative to the use of the term "interest" would have been a
painstaking enumeration of the specific things subject to forfeiture. This is the ap-
proach taken in some of the bills recently introduced in Congress to reverse Maru-
beni and similar district court decisions. . . . When the RICO statute was enacted,
however, Congress had no way of anticipating such decisions and, without the
knowledge subsequently gained in RICO investigations and prosecutions, Congress
may have been hesitant to attempt to compile an exhaustive list of things subject to
forfeiture. Wishing to strike broadly at the fruits of racketeering, Congress there-
fore selected the term "interest," the broadest term at its disposal.
Brief for the United States at 16-17, Russello.
126 Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 at 362
(1982). The Supreme Court cited the liberal construction clause in Russello, see supra
note 93 and accompanying text, as well as in Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587. The Court cau-
tioned in Turkette, however, that its conclusion in that case would remain the same
"[w]ith or without this admonition [the liberal construction clause]." Id. As to the role
of the liberal construction clause generally, see Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction
Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167 (1980). A number of courts have drawn upon the liberal
construction clause in their applications of RICO. See, e.g. , United States v. Thompson,
685 F.2d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 86-87 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 390 (1983); United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652
F.2d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 636 (1982); United States v.
Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); United
States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980);
United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1021 (1978); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1089-92 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921
(1977); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 416 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
904 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976);
United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975).
Some courts, however, have declined to apply RICO's provisions broadly, at least in
a criminal context. In Thevis, for example, the district court, in holding the scope of
§ 1963 (a)(1) to be limited to interests in an enterprise, counseled that the liberal
construction
mandate must be ignored when the statute to be interpreted proscribes certain ac-
tivities or provides for forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in violation of
the proscribed activities. . . . To do otherwise and allow a broad, expansive con-
struction of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) is to invite serious due process problems under the
Fifth Amendment.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 142 (citation and footnote omitted). The district court added, "A
liberal construction of 'interest' would foment these constitutional confrontations." Id.
at 142 n.13. Some commentators also have advocated limiting the application of the
liberal construction clause. See Bradley, supra note 57, at 860 n.126 (positing applica-
tion of liberal construction clause to remedial civil portions only); Taylor, supra note 34,
at 389 (courts should construe RICO forfeiture provisions strictly against the govern-
ment despite liberal construction clause because of due process, vagueness, and dispro-
portionality considerations). Nevertheless, most courts have applied the liberal
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these factors support an expansive reading of RICO.
There are considerations, however, that might militate against a
broad reading of a federal criminal statute in general and RICO's in
personam criminal forfeiture provision in particular. First, the "rule
of lenity" might play a role in the interpretation of RICO's provi-
sions. The rule of lenity is a general principle of statutory construc-
tion that, in cases of ambiguity, favors strictly construing criminal
statutes against the government. 127 Because the Russello Court
found RICO's forfeiture language to be clear and unambiguous, the
Court never addressed squarely the possibly antagonistic roles of
the rule of lenity and RICO's liberal construction clause in the inter-
pretation of RICO's provisions.' 28 Nevertheless, the Court seems
to have correctly denied weight to the rule of lenity in the context of
RICO because the interests that the rule of lenity seeks to pro-
mote 29 are not endangered by a broad reading of RICO.' 30
construction clause generally to RICO's criminal as well as civil provisions. See Weiner,
supra note 15, at 236 n.43. On another level, Blakey has noted and harshly criticized the
fact that the ABA House of Delegates, at the urging of the Section on Criminal Justice,
adopted a recommendation that the liberal construction clause be repealed for both
criminal and civil proceedings. See Blakey, supra note 15, at 246 n.25.
127 Although not supporting its application to RICO, Blakey discusses the rule of
lenity at length. He provides a useful definition of the principle: "The rule of lenity is a
rule of construction that says that the interpretation more favorable to the defendant
ought to be adopted when the text of the statute or its legislative history cannot be used
to resolve an ambiguity according to congressional intent." Blakey, supra note 15, at
290 n. 150 (citation omitted). On its rationale: "The modern rule of lenity is rooted in
two policies: the principle that fair warning of criminality ought to be given, and the
related principle that the moral condemnation of criminality should be based on a legis-
lative, not a judicial determination." Id. at 245 n.25 (citing Dunn v. United States, 442
U.S. 100, 113 (1979); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971)). The rule
generally is not seen as constitutionally based, but rather as a nonconstitutional rule of
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Rewis, 401 U.S. 808, 811 n.5 (1971);
Blakey, supra note 15, at 290 n. 150. Indeed, most states have abandoned the common
law rule of strict construction in favor of, for example, "fair import" or "liberal" con-
struction. See id. at 246-47 n.25 (collecting statutes). For a general discussion of the
difference between liberal and strict interpretation, see 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRUcTION § 58.02 (revised 4th ed. 1984).
128 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court advised in Callanan
v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961), and repeated in Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587
n.10, that the rule of lenity is not to be used to create an ambiguity where none exists.
Interestingly, although the Court refused to apply the rule of lenity in Russello because it
found the statutory language clear, it nevertheless drew on the liberal construction
clause as a persuasive indication of Congress' broad purpose in enacting RICO. See
supra note 93 and accompanying text. The en banc Fifth Circuit in Martino also declined
to find a conflict between the rule of lenity and the liberal construction clause. See supra
note 44. That court, however, refused to invoke either of those interpretive aids be-
cause, in its opinion, no ambiguity existed. Id.
129 See supra note 127 for identification of the two basic rationales for the rule of
lenity.
130 As to the "fair warning" component, it is clear that illegal profits are potentially
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Some lower courts have strictly construed RICO's forfeiture
provision because of its in personam nature. 131 These courts have
viewed such in personam forfeitures as suspect because of a long his-
tory, extending back to England, of disfavor for in personam forfeit-
ures.1 32 The Supreme Court in Russello briefly mentioned the
subject to disgorgement. If nothing else, § 1964(c) authorizes injured persons to re-
cover treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees as a civil remedy. See supra note 116
(§ 1964). Blakey reasons that any due process considerations are met when liberal con-
struction is mandated by the legislature. Blakey, supra note 15, at 290 n.150. On a
different tack, he argues that imposing the rule of lenity on RICO generally would pres-
ent a double application of that principle (and double "fair warning") because the rule
presumably is relied upon to the extent appropriate in construing the predicate offenses
underlying RICO "racketeering activity." Id. at 245-46 n.25. Finally, the legislative
enunciation of opprobrium for a wide range of racketeering activities in RICO is quite
evident in its substantive provisions and in its liberal construction clause. Cf. United
States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975) (" 'The canon in favor of strict construction is
not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory pur-
pose.' ") (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948)). See also Turkette,
452 U.S. at 588 n.10.
131 A RICO forfeiture is in personam in that it acts "against a person involving his
personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person, as distinguished from a judg-
ment against property [in rem]," BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979), and it
occurs only upon the defendant's conviction, see Taylor, supra note 34, at 380. The
Justice Department delineated the salient distinctions between in personam and in rem
forfeiture:
The concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty which is embodied in this provi-
sion differs from other presently existing forfeiture provisions under Federal stat-
utes where the proceeding is in rem against the property and the thing which is
declared unlawful under the statute, or which is used for an unlawful purpose, or in
connection with the prohibited property or transaction, is considered the offender,
and the forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense.
Under the criminal forfeiture of section 1963, however, the proceeding is in
personam against the defendant who is the party to be punished upon conviction of
violation of any provision of the section, not only by fine and/or imprisonment, but
also by forfeiture of all interest in the enterprise.
S. REP. No. 617, supra note 112, at 79-80 (prepared statement for U.S. Dep't ofJustice).
Several courts have noted, however, that there exists no substantial difference in prac-
tice between RICO's in personam forfeiture and in rem forfeitures, at least where the
RICO forfeiture is limited to interests or property put to an illegal use under § 1962.
See, e.g., United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
830 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1979). In Russello, the defendant's for-
feited insurance proceeds had not, strictly speaking, been put to an illegal use (although
arguably the insurance policy had so been), but rather had been acquired through illegal
means. See Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 298.
132 See, e.g., McManigal, 708 F.2d at 286 ("In light of this history [disfavoring forfeit-
ures], it is necessary to proceed cautiously in construing the forfeiture provisions of
RICO.") (citation omitted); Martino, 681 F.2d at 962 (Politz, J., dissenting) ("Just as
nature abhors a vacuum, historically our society has abhorred forfeitures. . . .Further,
a forfeiture with an in personam application . . . is to be most charily assessed."); Joint
Appendix, Martino panel opinion on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 66 ("Viewed in that
perspective [history disfavoring forfeitures] one would expect that Congress would
strictly limit forfeitures."); Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 144 ("[The limited forfeiture of the
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argument but then ignored it.' 3 3 Notwithstanding the recitation by
lower courts of society's historical abhorrence of forfeitures, Con-
gress in recent years has relied increasingly upon the vehicle of in
personam forfeitures, specifically forfeitures of profits, in its legisla-
tion against criminal activity.1 34 This recent experience is reflected
in the RICO statute, which the Russello Court read as congressional
authorization of the forfeiture of such illegally obtained monetary
"interests."'' 35 Assuming the ultimate constitutionality of such in
personam forfeitures, 3 6 therefore, it seems reasonable to eschew, as
the Russello Court did implicitly, limiting the construction of the
property acquired, maintained, or utilized in the conduct proscribed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962 reflects, no doubt, our society's traditional concern for the sanctity of private
property afforded under both our Constitution and our system of economic develop-
ment.").
The United States Constitution itself embodies protections against forfeitures:
"The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainter
of Treason shall work corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. This protection was codified legisla-
tively in 1790. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 117, § 24 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563) ("[N]o conviction orjudgment. . . shall work corruption of blood, or any for-
feiture of estate."). For discussions of both the English and American history of forfeit-
ures, see Taylor, supra note 34, at 381-82; Weiner, supra note 15, at 229-32; see generally
Smith, Modern Fowfiture Law and Policy: A Proposalfor Reform, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 661
(1978). RICO's forfeiture provisions have been viewed by some as a partial repeal of
§ 3563, see United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir. 1977); Senate Hearings,
supra note 111, at 407 (Kleindienst letter), but have not been held to be constitutionally
prohibited forfeitures of estate, see United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir.
1979).
133 Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 299. The Court noted, "He [petitioner] rests his argument
upon the propositions that criminal forfeitures are disfavored in law and that forfeiture
statutes, as a consequence, must be strictly construed." Id. The Russello Court never
directly discussed this particular issue in the case.
134 The government in Russello, for instance, identified three other major statutes that
authorize the forfeiture of money used in or derived from unlawful activities in the con-
texts of illegal gambling businesses, 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1982), continuing criminal
enterprises, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982), and controlled substances violations, 21
U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982). Brief for the United States at 12, Russello. A number of states
also have passed RICO-type legislation, most providing for forfeiture of money and
property as well. See Brief of Petitioner at 8-9, Russello (collecting statutes); Blakey,
supra note 15, at 237-38 n.3 (collecting statutes). The government in Russello
concluded:
Whatever truth there may have been to this maxim ["society abhors forfeitures"] in
the past, it is plain that over the last 15 years Congress has come increasingly to
view forfeitures as an essential weapon in the battle against crime. It would there-
fore be more apt today to say that forfeitures are a preferred means of combatting
criminal activity.
Brief for the United States at 7, Russello.
135 See generally supra notes 55-100 and accompanying text.
136 RICO's forfeiture provision has been upheld as constitutional. See, e.g., United
States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039-40 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980);




Section 1963(a)(1) forfeiture provision based on vaguely'defined,
nonconstitutionally based presumptions concerning the inherent
"badness" of extracting ill-gotten gains from convicted criminals.1 37
C. RICO'S STRUCTURAL CONGRUITY-HOW IT ALL FITS
A key consideration in statutory interpretation concerns
whether the result of the process of interpretation is consistent with
the statutory scheme.138 The Supreme Court, for example, holding
in United States v. Turkette 13 9 that a RICO "enterprise" encompassed
both legitimate enterprises and illegitimate associations in fact, ex-
amined the effect that its interpretation of the term "enterprise"
would work on RICO's statutory scheme. 140 The Court concluded
in Turkette that broadly interpreting the term "enterprise" to apply
to criminal organizations would neither "render any portion of the
statute superfluous nor . . create any structural incongruities
within the framework of the Act."' 14 1
The Russello Court engaged in a similar analysis and concluded
that an expansive reading of "interest" in Section 1963(a)(1) would
not render Section 1963(a)(2) "mere surplusage."'' 42 The Court
adopted the government's position that Subsection (a)(2) was distin-
guishable from (a) (1) in that an (a) (2) interest in the enterprise need
not be illegally acquired, whereas an (a)(1) interest must be "ac-
quired or maintained in violation of section 1962." 143 The Russello
Court concluded that there did exist "things forfeitable under one,
but not the other, of each of the subsections."' 144
The Supreme Court's approach in Russello stands in sharp con-
trast with what had been the position of a number of lower courts.
Because the term "interest" in Section 1963 is not defined, most
137 At oral argument in Russello, Assistant to the Solicitor General Alito commented
that it was farfetched to suggest that Congress had entertained unexpressed doubts re-
garding the constitutionality of forfeiture of proceeds under RICO because, among
other things, it obviously had enacted the provision, manifesting no "abhorrence." 34
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4038, 4039 (Oct. 12, 1983).
138 See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 ("internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt
with") (citation omitted).
139 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
140 Id. at 587.
141 Id. The Court continued, "The result is neither absurd nor surprising. On the
contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the
more incongruous position." Id.
142 See supra text accompanying note 83.
143 See supra note 84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Russello Court's
language, the government's position in Russello, and an analysis of this distinction. For
the text of § 1963, see supra note 7.
144 104 S. Ct. at 301 (footnote omitted).
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lower courts prior to Russello had looked to Section 1962's prohibi-
tions to clarify the scope of, and in particular to provide an enter-
prise limitation to, the definition of "interest" in Section
1963(a)(1).145 Additionally, these courts often tied the application
of RICO's specific forfeiture provisions (Section 1963(a)(1) or
(a) (2)) to specific prohibitory provisions (Section 1962 (a), (b), (c), or
(d)).146 Petitioner in Russello similarly suggested such a relationship
145 See, e.g., McManigal, 708 F.2d at 284-87; United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186,
1195 (10th Cir. 1982); Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 765-69; Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 142. See
also Taylor, supra note 34, at 386-89. The district court in Thevis explained its reading
of the two RICO sections:
[T]he employment of that term ("interest"] establishes additional limits for the for-
feiture mandated under § 1963(a)(1).
Curiously, the term "interest" is not defined by RICO, but as employed in 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a), it derives its meaning from the activities barred by § 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) is directed at an interest acquired or maintained "in
violation of section 1962. " (emphasis added). The statutory concept on which 18
U.S.C. § 1962 rests is the "enterprise" concept; that is to say, it is the acquisition,
maintenance, or participation in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity that is proscribed under that section. Since it is the addition of the "enter-
prise" concept which distinguishes a RICO prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1962
from an ordinary prosecution directed at each of the individual predicated [sic] acts
which constitute the pattern of racketeering activity, this Court is convinced that the
"interest" subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) is limited to the interest
in the enterprise and does not extend to fruits or profits generated from the
enterprise.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 142. In a post-Martino appellate opinion, the Seventh Circuit in
McManigal expressed similar sentiments:
It is not really possible to determine the meaning of the word "interest" simply
from reading Section 1963. Contra Martino, supra, 681 F.2d at 954-956 and n. 16.
An examination of the substantive provisions in Section 1962 supports a narrow
reading of the term "interest." Section 1962(a), for example, makes it illegal only
to invest income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. Though Congress
obviously recognized that income and profits could be generated by a pattern of
racketeering activity, it chose to criminalize only the investment of that income, ex-
cept under the 1% investment exception, when the total investment is de minimis
and thus would not grant the racketeer control over the business. The earning of
illegal income itself is not prohibited under RICO. Rather the entire statutory
scheme is based on the "enterprise" concept, and it is that concept which distin-
guishes a RICO prosecution from any other prosecution. Although the Fifth Circuit
is technically correct when it says that the enterprise concept applies to a RICO
prosecution under Section 1962, and not necessarily to the forfeiture provisions of
Section 1963, Martino, supra, 681 F.2d at 955 and n. 15, it makes sense in constru-
ing the scope of the statute to read the prohibitory and penal sections in a similar
way.
McManigal, 708 F.2d at 284-85.
146 For example, the McManigal court opined that "the forfeiture sanctions in Section
1963(a)(1) and (a)(2) were meant to apply to different types of illegal behavior under
Section 1962." 708 F.2d at 286. The court of appeals continued:
Section 1963(a)(1) requires forfeiture of any interest defendant "has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962." Yet one cannot "acquire" or "maintain"
an interest "in violation of section 1962" except by violating Section 1962(a) or (b).
In this sense, Section 1963(a)(1) does tie forfeiture to violations only of Sections
1962(a) and (b). Contra Martino, supra, 681 F.2d at 955. Thus the forfeiture sanc-
tion in Section 1963(a)(1) is meant to apply to interests in a business acquired with
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between Sections 1962 and 1963.147
Courts and commentators supporting the imposition of an en-
terprise element into the RICO forfeiture mechanism argued that
such an interpretation provides meaning for all parts of Sections
1962 and 1963. Courts opposing an implied enterprise require-
ment argued that Section 1963(a)(1) would have no role independ-
ent of Section 1963 (a) (2) were an enterprise requirement to be read
into (a)(1).148 In response, several courts espoused an "active-pas-
sive" or "control-no control" distinction between the two subsec-
tions: interests in an enterprise affording the defendant an active
role, entailing control or influence over the enterprise, would be
tainted money under Section 1962(a), and to interests in an enterprise acquired or
maintained by racketeering activity under Section 1962(b). The forfeiture sanction
in Section 1963(a)(2) is meant to apply to interests in an enterprise which is in-
volved in conduct violative of Section 1962(c), as well as conduct violative of Sec-
tion 1962(a) that does not involve "acquiring" or "maintaining" an interest in an
enterprise. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 291, 307-308 (1983).
Id. at 286-87 (emphasis in original). See also Taylor, supra note 34, at 387 ("Marubeni
and Thevis are correct. One cannot 'acquire' or 'maintain' an interest 'in violation of
section 1962' except by violating section 1962(a) or (b).").
This formulation, restricting a § 1963(a)(1) forfeiture to § 1962(a) and (b) viola-
tions, seems to beg the question of what constitutes a § 1963(a)(1) "interest." If an
"interest" is restricted to investment in or control of an enterprise, then § 1962(a) and
(b) may be the only subsections of § 1962 under which a RICO defendant could illegally
"acquire or maintain" an interest. If an "interest" is seen as a broader notion, however,
encompassing the insurance proceeds at issue in Russello, for example, such "interests"
could clearly be "acquired or maintained" through a violation of § 1962(c), or perhaps §
1962(d), as the facts in Russello bear out. Furthermore, it is unclear under this interpre-
tation why an interest could not be maintained in violation of § 1962(c), for instance,
whether or not the interest were acquired in violation thereof. See supra note 84. For
further criticism of the restrictive position, see infra notes 160-64 and accompanying
text.
147 See Brief for Petitioner at 23, Russello. Petitioner provided a brief synopsis of the
suggested relationship between the two sections:
What, then, is the legal relationship between 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1963 pertain-
ing to forfeitable "interest"? A guide through the labyrinth would be as follows: 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a) and (b) relate to enterprises in law, while 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) re-
lates to employees in enterprises in law and to enterprises in fact. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(2) provides for the forfeiture of active investments and interests obtained
by enterprises in law in which either a controlling interest or over one per cent
investment has been obtained. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) provides for the forfeiture
of passive investments and interests obtained by enterprises in law in which neither
a controlling interest nor over one per cent investment has been obtained. In addi-
tion, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) provides for the forfeiture of interests in the enterprise
obtained by enterprises in fact, such as real estate and other investments. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(1), being limited to interests in the enterprise and to individual members'
interest in said enterprise, does not extend to profits or dividends which have been
distributed and over which the enterprise has no control.
Id.
148 See, e.g., Martino, 681 F.2d at 955 ("reading an enterprise limitation into
§ 1963(a)(1) renders that section surplusage. . . . Section 1963(a)(1) would merely be
duplicative of this provision [§ 1963(a)(2)] if. . . it reaches only interests in an enter-
prise acquired or maintained in violation of §§ 1962(a) or (b).").
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reachable under Section 1963(a)(2); Subsection (a)(1), on the other
hand, would extend to passive interests, involving no control or in-
fluence, where those interests were acquired or maintained in viola-
tion of Section 1962.149 Adherents to this theory contended that if
an enterprise requirement were not read into Section 1963(a)(1), it
would be Subsection (a)(2), and not (a)(1), that was rendered sur-
plusage. 150 Simply put, this argument asserts that were (a)(1)'s use
of the term "interest" to be broadly interpreted, (a)(2)'s phrasing of
"interest in . . .any enterprise" would become in effect a "lesser
included" of (a)(1).15 1 The Supreme Court in Russello, however, ex-
plicitly rejected this analysis as "plainly incorrect."1 52
Notwithstanding the lower court case law to the contrary, sev-
eral justifications exist to support the Supreme Court's rejection in
Russello of an implied enterprise requirement in Section 1963(a)(1).
First, the Russello Court's framework is more consistent with the dif-
ferent roles a RICO enterprise may assume. The fact that a RICO
enterprise may take a variety of forms1 53 occasions also a variety of
roles that an enterprise may play in a RICO violation. Professor
Blakey has identified four categories that may aid analysis: prize,
instrument, victim, and perpetrator. 54 He suggests that the reme-
149 See, e.g., McManigal, 708 F.2d at 287; Martino, 681 F.2d at 963 (PolitzJ., dissent-
ing); Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 143 n.14. See also 34 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4038, 4039 (Oct.
12, 1983) (petitioner in oral argument in Russello); Brief for Petitioner at 18, Russello;
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 52, at 12-13.
150 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, Russello: Petition for Certiorari, supra note
52, at 16.
151 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 52, at 16.
152 Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 301. For more detailed discussion of the Court's analysis,
see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
153 The Supreme Court has recognized that a RICO "enterprise" encompasses both
legitimate and wholly illegitmate organizations. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580; see also Rus-
sello, 104 S. Ct. at 301 (citing Turkette). Blakey has commented on the range of organiza-
tions that may constitute a RICO enterprise:
The concept of "enterprise" may be divided into four broad categories: (1) com-
mercial entities (e.g. corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships); (2) benevo-
lent organizations (e.g. unions, benefit funds, schools); (3) governmental units (e.g.
the office of a governor, a state legislator, a court, a prosecutor's office, a police or
sheriff's department, or an executive department or agency); or (4) associations in
fact (licit or illicit). The categories are not mutually exclusive.
Blakey, supra note 15, at 290-300 (footnotes omitted).
154 Blakey, supra note 15, at 306-07. He explains his categorization:
Since RICO's standards make "unlawful" certain investments, acquisitions or con-
duct in connection with an "enterprises," [sic] the roles that the enterprise may play
in a violation of these standards may be variously-but not mutually exclusively-
described as "prize," "instrument," "victim," or "perpetrator."
A violation involving an unlawful investment will usually cast the enterprise in
the role of a "prize." Typically, a violation involving an unlawful acquisition will
find the enterprise in the role of "prize" or "victim." Violations involving the oper-
ation of an enterprise by a pattern of racketeering activity may find the enterprise in
the role of an "instrument, victim," or "perpetrator."
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dial purpose, both civil and criminal, underlying the prosecution of
a RICO violation may vary with the function of the enterprise in a
particular scheme. 155 In the RICO criminal forfeiture setting, read-
ing an implicit enterprise requirement into Section 1963 does not
accommodate adequately the statutory remedial purpose of forfei-
ture where the RICO enterprise serves not as a prize or victim, but
as an instrument or perpetrator. As the Court in Russello recog-
nized, 56 such a construction allows no room for forfeiture of inter-
ests in the context of an illicit association in fact, which inevitably
will be cast in the role of "perpetrator."' 157 The apparent single-
mindedness of these lower courts in envisioning a RICO enterprise
for forfeiture purposes only in terms of a prize or victim is under-
scored initially by their focus on "invested" interests and their con-
sequent dismissal of the problems faced in forfeiting interests "in
the enterprise" in the case of associations in fact. 158 This concep-
tual tunnel vision is evidenced secondly by the emphasis of these
courts on the prevention of infiltration of legitimate business as
Congress' goal in enacting RICO, to the exclusion of the goal of
reaching organized crime's ill-gotten gains.' 59
A second justification for Russello's rejection of an enterprise
element in Section 1963(a)(1) is that although Section 1963 dearly
employs Section 1962 as a referent, 60 any limiting relationship be-
Id. at 306-09 (footnotes omitted). Blakey presents these categories in the context of an
analysis of the application of RICO's substantive liability provisions. They may never-
theless be of help here in examining the role of the enterprise with respect to RICO's
remedial provisions.
155 Id. at 323 (footnote omitted). Blakey provides the following illustrative
application:
Where an enterprise is a "prize" or "victim," no salutory remedial purpose would
be served by attributing the conduct of an individual involved in the pattern of rack-
eteering activity to the individual or entity playing the role of the enterprise,
whether for civil liability or criminal responsibility. Indeed, doing so would under-
mine the purpose of the Act. On the other hand, the remedial purpose of the stat-
ute would be enhanced by such an attribution where the individual or entity was
playing the role of "perpetrator."...
A more difficult issue, however, is presented by the role of "instrument." The
enterprise is used in the unlawful conduct, but it is not its author in the same sense
as when the enterprise is the "perpetrator." Nonetheless, it is not wholly innocent,
as when it plays the role of purely a "prize" or "victim.". . . On balance, the reme-
dial purposes of RICO tip the judgment toward finding civil liability, but not crimi-
nal responsibility for the enterprise when its role is purely that of "instrument."
Id. at 323-24 (footnotes omitted).
156 See supra text accompanying note 86.
157 Blakey, supra note 15, at 322 n.178 ("Where the enterprise is an illicit association
in fact ... the association will inevitably play the role of 'perpetrator.' ") (citing, inter
alia, Turkette).
158 See supra note 37; infra note 174.
159 See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
160 Both § 1963(a) generally and § 1963(a)(1) specifically point to § 1962: "Whoever
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tween Section 1962's provisions and those of Section 1963 is, at the
very least, of arguable degree and significance. The Fifth Circuit in
Martino construed the two sections to operate independently once
the forfeiture mechanism is activated:
To be sure, the reference [in Section 1963(a)(1) to Section 1962]
serves a kind of limiting function, but that function is not to define the
type of forfeitable interests. . . .Rather, the reference merely identi-
fies the illegal activities which trigger the forfeiture penalty, supplying
the nexus between the RICO violation and the forfeitable property
which the government must establish at trial. 16 1
If sections 1962 and 1963 do operate independently to a large ex-
tent, it follows that any of the provisions of Section 1962, and not
just Section 1962(a) or (b), can trigger a Section 1963 forfeiture.1 62
Indeed, such an interpretation is necessary to afford Section 1962(c)
an identifiable role in a Section 1963 forfeiture. 63 Finally, Section
1962(a)'s "one per cent investment exception" need not be read as
immunizing invested funds from a forfeiture that results from viola-
tions of other provisions of Section 1962 the exception is therefore
not conclusive with respect to the proper scope of Section
1963(a)(1). 16 4
violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more than $25,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States
(1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962 ..... 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982) (emphasis supplied).
161 Martino, 681 F.2d at 955 (footnote omitted). The court of appeals elaborated its
view in a footnote: "That the enterprise concept is the overriding concept in RICO,
distinguishing a RICO prosecution from an ordinary prosecution for the predicate acts of
racketeering, does not necessarily mean that the enterprise concept is also a limitation
on the type of property interests subject to forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1)." Id. at 955
n. 15 (emphasis in original).
162 Id. at 955. See also Brief for the United States at 27 n.9, Russello (limiting
§ 1963(a)(1) forfeitures to § 1962(a) or (b) violations, and § 1963(a)(2) forfeitures to
§ 1962(c) violations, is "obviously untenable").
163 The Martino court explained: "If § 1962(c) results in any forfeiture at all-and
§ 1963(a) provides for forfeiture if one violates any § 1962 section-it must provide for
forfeiture of something more than § 1962(a) or (b) or be mere surplusage." 681 F.2d at
956 (emphasis in original).
164 Section 1962(a)'s "1% investment exception" essentially provides that purchases
of securities for investment purposes aggregating less than one per cent of the issuer's
outstanding securities are exempt from § 1962(a) liability. See supra note 15 (text
§ 1962). The Ninth Circuit in Marubeni assigned significant weight to this language,
reasoning that "[Clongress would not have established rules for the investment of racke-
teering income, enforced by the penalty of criminal forfeiture, if it intended the govern-
ment to seize that income regardless of how it was used." Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 767.
The "1% investment exception" is not, however, rendered meaningless by Russello's
interpretation of § 1963(a)(1). See Martino, 681 F.2d at 960. The Martino court observed
that
the exception functions as a practical limit, exempting from prosecution what other-
wise would constitute illegal activity under § 1962(a). If the investment of illegally
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D. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND RICO'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
An examination of the legislative history accompanying the pas-
sage of RICO 65 may aid in interpreting the language of the statute
and, specifically, the language of Section 1963(a)(1). Although anal-
ysis of such legislative history has its limitations, 166 review of several
aspects of RICO's enactment supports the conclusion that RICO
represents a broad approach to organized crime and its related
problems. Initially, Congress' Statement of Findings and Purpose
reveals legislative concern that existing "sanctions and remedies
available to the Government [had been] . . . unnecessarily limited
in scope and impact. ' 167 Moreover, individual statements of key
legislators and others in floor debate bolster the view that RICO was
designed as a crime-fighting measure of "unprecedented scope."' 68
derived income constitutes less than 1% of the issuer's outstanding shares, that
investment alone violates no criminal proscription and hence triggers no forfeiture
at all. The exception thus limits the definition of what is illegal. It does not immu-
nize from forfeiture the fruits of activities that are made illegal under other provi-
sions of § 1962; it "does not create a class of investment of illicit income exempt
from forfeiture."
Id. (quoting Trojanowski, RICO Fodreiture: Tracing and Procedure; Appendix: United States
v. Marubeni America Corp. and the Scope of RICO Forfeiture, in 1 TECHNIQUES IN THE IN-
VESTIGATION AND PROSECUTON OF ORGANIZED CRIME 378a, 378aa (G. Blakey ed. 1980).
See also Brief for the United States at 10, Russello ("It was completely consistent for
Congress to require forfeiture of racketeering profits and proceeds while also providing
that under certain circumstances [the 'I% investment exception'] the investment of such
moneys is not a separate crime.").
165 RICO's enactment enjoyed clear legislative support. The Senate passed S. 30, the
Organized Crime Control Act, of which RICO was Title IX, by a 73 to I vote, with
twenty-two additional senators later indicating that they would have voted for the bill.
See 116 CONG. REC. 972, 25,192 (1970). The House, after minor amendments, passed
the legislation by a 431 to 26 margin. See id. at 35,363. The Senate later accepted the
House amendments on a voice vote. See id. at 36,296.
166 The most obvious limitation is that the statutory language, not the legislative his-
tory, is the "law of the land." Martino, 681 F.2d at 958 n.22. As to the role of RICO's
legislative history generally, see Note, supra note 34. For a discussion of the problems
faced in employing legislative history to determine the purpose of a legislature in enact-
ing a particular statute, see Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Re-
view and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1071-77 (1979). Finally, Congress
clearly "cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction
that may arise." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341 (1981).
167 Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 at 362
(1982). For the full text of the congressional statement, see supra note 92. The
Supreme Court in Russello and Turkette relied upon this statement in interpreting
RICO's provisions, see supra note 92 and accompanying text, as did the Martino court,
681 F.2d at 956. At least one lower court, however, the Seventh Circuit in McManigal,
has quoted the congressional statement in support of a restricted reading of
§ 1963(a)(1), emphasizing the "infiltration" language employed in the third clause. See
McManigal, 708 F.2d at 285.
168 Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 302 ("The legislative history clearly demonstrates that the
RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an as-
sault upon organized crime and its economic roots."). See also Turhette, 452 U.S. at 586
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Indeed, the legislative record manifests Congress' recognition that
RICO's reach clearly extended beyond traditional notions of "or-
ganized crime."1 69 The perceived scope of RICO's mandate is re-
("[T]he language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Congress was well
aware that it was entering a new domain of federal involvement through the enactment
of this measure."); Martino, 681 F.2d at 961 ("RICO is a powerful and flexible weapon
designed to break the economic power of organized crime and hence to undermine its
ability to disrupt and drain the national economy."); id. at 962 (Politz, J., dissenting)
("RICO is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Congress' solar plexus
blow to organized crime."); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) ("[T]he RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest
fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise."); Weiner, supra note 15, at 225
(RICO "is a powerful federal statute passed by Congress to provide strong remedies
intended to deal with the national problem of corrupt criminal organizations and the
infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses.").
This Note will avoid extensive examination of the statements of individual legisla-
tors, which itself could be and has been the subject of exhaustive academic analysis. See,
e.g., Blakey, supra note 15, at 249-80. Professor Blakey has concluded:
This review of the legislative history of S. 30 in general, and Title IX in particu-
lar, establishes the following points beyond serious question:
(1) Congress fully intended, after specific debate, to have RICO apply beyond
any limiting concept like "organized crime" or "racketeering";
(2) Congress deliberately redrafted RICO outside of the antitrust statutes, so
that it would not be limited by antitrust concepts like "competitive," "commercial,"
or "direct or indirect" injury;
(3) Both immediate victims of racketeering activity and competing organizations
were contemplated as civil plaintiffs for injunction, damage, and other relief;
(4) Over specific objections raising issues of federal-state relations and crowded
court dockets, Congress deliberately extended RICO to the general field of commer-
cial and other fraud; and
(5) Congress was well aware that it was creating important new federal criminal
and civil remedies in a field traditionally occupied by common law fraud.
Id. at 280 (emphasis in original).
169 Several commentators noted at the time of RICO's passage that the reach of
RICO's predicate offenses encompassed significantly more than would ordinarily be
considered "organized crime." See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 11I, at 404-07
(DOJ); id. at 475 (ACLU). For this reason, Representative Cellar, Chairman of the
HouseJudiciary Committee, suggested the possibility of renaming the Organized Crime
Control Act. See Organized Crime Control, Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Sub-
comm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciaty, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 185 (during testi-
mony of Attorney General Mitchell). One commentator has stated that RICO must
necessarily catch much ordinary white collar crime, for instance, as incidental to an effec-
tive attack on organized crime. See Weiner, supra note 15, at 228 n.13.
The breadth of RICO's application has engendered concern in some circles that
RICO charges may unjustly tarnish defendants' reputations. See, e.g., 1982 A.B.A. SEc.
CRIM. JUST. REP. 4; Brief of Amici Curiae Boston Bar Ass'n and Mass. Ass'n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, Turhette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), quoted in Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick,
Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 673
(1982). But see United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306 (7th Cir. 1979) ("If a defend-
ant qualifies as a racketeer able to accomplish the same illegal goals as organized crime
he qualifies for punishment."); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1029 n.91
(1980) ("There is nothing in RICO that says that if legitimate businessmen act like rack-
eteers, they should not be treated like racketeers."); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and
Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (1982) ("RICO claims can
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flected in its wide-ranging applications in practice. 70
Courts nevertheless have differed in their readings of RICO's
legislative purpose. Courts adopting the more expansive view,
which prevailed in Russello, have culled from RICO's legislative his-
tory a legislative purpose of attacking organized crime's wealth and
its illegal income.1 71 Courts engaging in a more limited reading
concluded that RICO's drafters intended a "surgical"' 172 role for
RICO and its forfeiture sanction: Congress intended through RICO
forfeiture to extricate the racketeer from the infiltrated enterprise,
and did not intend a "broadsides"173 attack on racketeering through
forfeiture.' 74 The latter view posited that unrestrained forfeiture
stigmatize defendants only if courts restrict the applicability of the broad statutory lan-
guage to proven organized criminals.").
170 RICO's provisions, both civil and criminal, have been applied in a wide variety of
situations. See generally Blakey, supra note 15, at 280-349 (discussing cases). Unusual
applications, however, may occasion some judicial hesitation. See, e.g., United States v.
Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979) (subsidiary's conduct attributable to parent,
but government should avoid "undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO for situations
where it was not primarily intended"). But cf. Martino, 681 F.2d at 961 (RICO's
"breadth supplies a potential for great abuse" but "[t]he harshness of the statute's im-
pact. . . cannot dictate the proper construction of its provisions."). See generally Tar-
low, supra note 57.
171 See, e.g., Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 303 ("The broader goal [of RICO] was to remove
the profit from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his dishonest gains.");
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588-93 (discussing at length statements of individual legislators
concerning organized crime's employment of economic power in general and ill-gotten
gains in particular); Martino, 681 F.2d at 957 ("Simply put, Congress' express objective
in RICO is to take the profit out of organized crime.") (footnote omitted); United States
v. Romano, 523 F. Supp. 1209, 1211 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (purpose of forfeiture is to divest
associations of fruits of ill-gotten gain); Weiner, supra note 15, at 240 ("The legislative
record is replete with references to Congress' determination to take the profit out of
large-scale crime.") (footnote omitted). Senate and House reports on RICO reflected
this concern with organized crime's ill-gotten wealth. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note
112, at 79 (Senate Judiciary Committee conclusion that legislation must deal both with
individuals and their economic base); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57
(1970) (HouseJudiciary Committee "Section Analysis" explaining that forfeiture provi-
sion applies to "all property and interests, as broadly described, which are related to the
violations") [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1549].
172 Taylor, supra note 34, at 380 ("Congress expected forfeiture to play a surgical, not
a destructive role in the statutory scheme.").
173 Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 769 ("Congress plainly imposed criminal forfeiture to sepa-
rate racketeers from the enterprises they owned, controlled or operated and not to at-
tack racketeering broadsides.") (footnote omitted).
174 See, e.g., id. at 769 n. 11 ("We believe anyone who reads the legislative history
must be struck by the singlemindedness with which Congress drafted RICO. Congress
declared over and over again that its purpose was to rid legitimate organizations of the
influence of organized crime. This purpose must be the linchpin of any construction of
RICO."); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977) (Congress "in-
tended forfeiture fully to serve the broader goal of legally separating persons who run
an enterprise through the defined racketeering activity from the enterprise itself."); The-
vis, 474 F. Supp. at 142 ("Though Congress recognized that income and profits could
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would work harmful financial effect on otherwise legitimate busi-
nesses and their assets.1 75 This position dismissed as "simply rhe-
torical approximations" those "isolated references" by legislators
that described RICO generally, and forfeiture specifically, as
targeted at organized crime's "ill-gotten gains." 176
be generated by a pattern of racketeering activity, it chose to require forfeiture only of
the interest in, and not the income of, a § 1962 enterprise."); Taylor, supra note 34, at
389 ("Congress sought to rid American business of organized crime, not to bankrupt
the criminal."). This view also points, for support, to the same Senate and House re-
ports on which the more expansive reading is based. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note
112, at 160 ("The language [of § 1963] is designed to accomplish a forfeiture of any
'interest' of any type in the enterprise acquired by the defendant or in which the defend-
ant has participated in violation of section 1962."); H.R. REP. No. 1549, supra note 171,
at 35, 57 (forfeiture of interest "in an enterprise"). Note that this view apparently pre-
supposes the enterprise as "victim" rather then "perpetrator." See supra text accompa-
nying notes 158-59.
175 See Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Russello; Taylor, supra note 34, at 381, 385. Tay-
lor, on whose analysis the petitioner in Russello heavily relied, explained the predicted
effect on legitimate business:
Constitutional infirmities aside, unless RICO forfeitures are limited to the statute's
language and purpose, they can threaten massive destruction of legitimately-ac-
quired assets, a result Congress did not intend to achieve.
...[W]ith RICO, Congress could not rationally seek forfeiture of all proceeds
or fruits of a racketeer-influenced, but otherwise inherently legitimate, endeavor.
Destruction of the enterprise is not the goal. The income and proceeds may be
attributable, at least in part, to the efficacy of the legitimate endeavor, not to the
racketeering methods.
Taylor, supra note 34, at 381, 385. Petitioner in Russello similarly opined that the gov-
ernment's interpretation of "interest," requiring forfeiture of illegal profits and pro-
ceeds, "could result in the dismantling of legitimate business" and "could directly affect
the stability of the company by causing extreme economic hardship, or even bank-
ruptcy." Brief for Petitioner at 16, 17, Russello. Several criticisms of this approach exist.
Initially, the view conceives of the enterprise only as both legitimate and or "victim,"
and not as an illegitimate "perpetrator." (Taylor wrote before the Supreme Court's
decision in Turkette, in which the Court affirmed the approach that had been adopted in
the majority of federal circuits by applying RICO's "enterprise" terminology to wholly
illegitimate organizations; petitioner in Russello did not.) Where the enterprise is an
illegitimate "perpetrator," RICO's goal is the destruction of the enterprise, and no part
of the income and proceeds is attributable to legitimate endeavor. Furthermore, even
hypothesizing an "otherwise inherently legitimate endeavor" whose assets are only in
part attributable to racketeering activity, it is difficult to equate the disgorgement of ill-
gotten profits and proceeds obtained through racketeering with the "destruction" of
legitimate business in general, or even that particular legitimate business. Forfeiture of
illegal gains would leave undisturbed the legitimate profit-making portions of the busi-
ness. Finally, assuming arguendo that such disgorgement would "dismantle" the particu-
lar enterprise, there seems little reason "why Congress would have been concerned
about preserving a business so dependent upon the fruits of illegal activity." Brief for
the United States at 24 n.7, Russello.
176 Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 768 n.10. See also McManigal, 708 F.2d at 286 n.5 (quoting
Marubeni). The McManigal court's reliance on the Marubeni characterization seems sur-
prising in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Turkette, in which the
Supreme Court examined these "isolated references" in considerable detail. See
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588-93.
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The more expansive interpretation of RICO is the more persua-
sive. First, those statements of RICO drafters and legislators speak-
ing to forfeiture of organized crime's "ill-gotten gains," and those
speaking to forfeiture of the racketeer's "interest in the enterprise,"
are not mutually exclusive. 177 Second, the broader construction at-
tacks organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business at its
source, the economic power of the racketeer, and therefore satisfies
both RICO's remedial and preventive purposes. 178 Finally, even if
the prevention of infiltration was the single goal of Congress in en-
acting RICO, that congressional concern with infiltration arguably
might extend to organized crime's control and infiltration of illegiti-
mate enterprises as well. 179
E. QUESTIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF RICO FORFEITURE
Interpreting Section 1963(a)(1) to authorize forfeiture of prof-
177 See, e.g., Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 303 ("Congress' concerns were not limited to infil-
tration"); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590-91 (Court "unpersuaded that Congress. . . confined
the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under
RICO, only the infiltration of legitimate business. . . . [N]one of these statements [ex-
pressing concern about organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business] requires
the negative inference that Title IX did not reach the activities of enterprises organized
and existing for criminal purposes.") (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); Martino,
681 F.2d at 957 n. 19 (congressional concern about infiltration "does not mean. . . that
we should blind ourselves to other forms of racketeering which Congress also declared
to be the object of its concern"); Weiner, supra note 15, at 240 ("Although there are
statements in the legislative history that indicate that forfeiture applies to a defendant's
interest in the RICO enterprise itself there is no statement that precludes the forfeiture
of other types of 'interests,' including money.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
178 The Turkette Court focused on organized crime's use of its illicit revenues "as a
springboard into the sphere of legitimate enterprise." 452 U.S. at 591 (citation omit-
ted). The Court further stressed both the remedial and the preventive functions of
RICO, requiring "some positive sign that the law was not to reach organized criminal
activities that gave rise to the concerns about infiltration." Id. at 593. See also Martino,
681 F.2d at 957 ("Section 1963(a) launches a two-pronged attack on the sources of eco-
nomic power which feed the coffers and activities of organized crime. It demands both
divestiture of power over the enterprise itself and seizure of the income derived from
racketeering activities.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Frnmento, 563 F.2d 1083,
1090 (3d Cir. 1977) (Congress was concerned with reducing invidious capabilities of
organized crime to infiltrate American economy), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
179 See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 584-85 ("It is obvious that §§ 1962(a) and (b)
address the infiltration by organized crime of legitimate businesses, but we cannot agree
that these sections were not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or
reinvesting in wholly illegal enterprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racke-
teering activity wholly illegitimate enterprises such as an illegal gambling business or a
loan-sharking operation."); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y.
198 1) (RICO deals with organized crime's control over business enterprises of all sorts,
whether legitimate or illegitimate); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 128
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (RICO purpose extends to infiltration of racketeering funds into illegit-
imate business as well as legitimate ones).
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its and proceeds of racketeering activity potentially impacts on
RICO's reach, operation, and constitutionality. Initially, one ques-
tion centers on how far a Section 1963(a)(1) forfeiture can extend:
what else is forfeitable besides the insurance proceeds at issue in
Russello, in light of the fact that the Supreme Court declined to offer
help in defining "profits" and "proceeds"?18 0 Given the Court's
broad language in its discussion of the term "interest,"' 8'1 and the
variety of possible applications of RICO's provisions,' 8 2 the federal
district courts can expect to address this issue in the near future.' 83
Russello's expansive construction of RICO's forfeiture language
also may affect the handling of a RICO prosecution. Initially, the
broader reading will "raise the stakes" generally because much
more potentially will be forfeitable in any given RICO criminal pros-
ecution. 8 4 One obvious side effect of greater potential criminal lia-
bility will be to provide the government more opportunity for plea
bargaining with potential RICO defendants.' 8 5 Greater criminal lia-
bility also may affect more directly specific procedural protec-
tions.' 8 6 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7, for instance,
requires the indictment to allege the extent of the interest or prop-
erty subject to forfeiture.' 8 7 Russello conceivably could affect this re-
quirement in several ways. Courts may require a greater degree of
specificity in the indictment to reflect the greater risk facing the
180 See supra note 56. The Court admittedly had no occasion on Russello's facts to
speak to what else might be forfeitable. See Brief for the United States at 20, Russello
("What other things may be subject to forfeiture under Section 1963(a)(1) need not be
decided here.").
181 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
183 The broad applicability of § 1963(a)(1) clearly may also increase the number of
forfeitures, which has been somewhat limited in the past. One commentator has attrib-
uted the low number of forfeitures to plea bargaining, asset depletion, non-application
of forfeiture to illegitimate associations in fact, reluctant judges, and unwilling prosecu-
tors. Weiner, supra note 15, at 227 n.12.
184 This effect would, of course, be incremental. RICO defendants already had faced
imprisonment, which assumedly carries some deterrent effect, and a fine, as well as for-
feiture of their interest in the enterprise. See supra note 7 (text § 1963).
185 See Weiner, supra note 15, at 227 & n.12 (noting that one reason for few forfeit-
ures under RICO historically was that some RICO indictments had "resulted in plea
bargains where criminal forfeiture was bargained out of the case").
186 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 1972 to include sev-
eral procedural protections to alleviate any due process problems in the criminal forfei-
ture area. Protective provisions include (1) Rule 7(c)(2) (specific notice to the defendant
in the indictment of potential forfeitable property), see supra note 32; infra notes 187-90
and accompanying text; (2) Rule 31 (e) (special jury verdict on extent of forfeiture), see
supra note 22; and (3) Rule 32(b)(2) (authorizing Attorney General to seize forfeited
property and fix "such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper"). See Wei-
ner, supra note 15, at 228 n.13.
187 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2). See supra note 32.
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RICO defendant.188 Or, courts may allow even the greater forfei-
ture liability to be based on "catch-all" indictment language, which
practice could, in the extreme, impinge on the defendant's due pro-
cess interests because of lack of adequate notice.189 Courts also may
188 Compliance with Rule 7(c)(2) requires specificity with respect to interests subject
to forfeiture. Weiner, supra note 15, at 247-48. Cf. United States v. Meyers, 432 F.
Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (denying motion to quash indictment for lack of speci-
ficity under Rule 7(c)(2) because there were no properly forfeitable interests in existence
to be so identified). For a discussion of the facts of Meyers, see supra note 32. In Rus-
sello, for instance, the government identified all claimed insurance checks by amount,
payor insurance company, payee defendant, date, and draft number, as well as other
potentially forfeitable interests, in a section of the indictment entitled "Forfeitures." See
Joint Appendix, Indictment, supra note 9, at 37-47. See also United States v. Peacock,
654 F.2d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 1981) (indictment meticulously setting out arsons that de-
fendants allegedly had committed and precise amount of insurance proceeds that de-
fendants gained from arsons gave defendants ample notice of property government
sought to have forfeited under RICO).
189 Courts have tolerated forfeiture of interests identified in indictments under
"catch-all" provisions. See, e.g., Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 145 (defendant's contention that
properties subject to forfeiture were not listed with sufficient particularity under Rule
7(c)(2) rejected where government sought forfeiture of defendant's entire interest in the
designated properties); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308, 1318-19 (D. Del.
1976) (upholding indictment seeking forfeiture of "all profits, interest in, claims against
or property or contract and rights" obtained from defendant's participation in continu-
ing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848). Prosecutors using such a
"catch-all" provision apparently would rely on facts elicited at trial to determine the
extent of the forfeiture to be sought at the end of the trial. Because a special jury verdict
on forfeiture is required by Rule 31(e), see supra note 22, the government eventually
would have to offer the jury a precise amount to be forfeited. But Cf. United States v.
Hess, 691 F.2d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1982) (no special verdict required in RICO criminal
forfeiture proceeding where defendants had stipulated "in lieu of a Special Verdict" as
to the amount of their interests in agricultural association).
The due process interests of RICO defendants might be implicated by use of these
"catch-all" provisions. As indicated in the text, Russello occasions a greater stake for the
RICO defendant facing criminal forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture orders traditionally have
been accorded certain procedural protections, as the discussion of Rule 7(c)(2) indi-
cates. A forfeiture order is a judgment separate from the sentence and commitment
order, requiring a separate notice of appeal. See Joint Appendix, Martino panel opinion
on forfeiture, supra note 29, at 64 n.19. The forfeiture may even be the subject of a
separate trial. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983) (RICO
forfeiture issue and instructions should be withheld from jury until general verdict re-
turned); Weiner, supra note 15, at 252 n.104 (there exists "little guidance currently as to
whether the trial should be bifurcated"). A district court has relatively little discretion
after a jury has found interests to be forfeitable under RICO. See United States v.
Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982) (district court obligated to order forfeiture after
jury determines applicability of forfeiture provision); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d
796, 812-13 (5th Cir.) (forfeiture of property mandatory afterjury forfeiture determina-
tion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). The district court may have some discretion
under § 1963(c) to set "terms and conditions" of the forfeiture. See supra nbte 7 (text
§ 1963). But see L'Hoste, 609 F.2d at - (district court's ability to set terms and'condi-
tions of RICO forfeiture is limited and any abuse of discretion is subject to appellate
review); Weiner, supra note 15, at 253 (§ 1963(c) should not be used to give district
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employ a mix of these approaches.19 0
Due to both the greater liability generally and the application of
RICO forfeiture to more monetary proceeds specifically, Russello's
holding likely will require a greater role than had previously been
the case for a host of restitutionary and other principles, such as
those concerning tracing of illegal proceeds into other forms, pro-
tection of innocent third parties, and relation back of forfeitable in-
terests to the time of the offense. The effective use of the RICO
criminal forfeiture penalty necessarily entails thorough investigation
of the defendant's financial affairs.' 9 ' However, neither the right to
use such investigations to trace funds to a particular RICO defend-
ant on restitution-type theories, 92 nor, conversely, the obligation to
so trace, is clearly established.193 A related issue centers on criminal
courts discretion to deny forfeitures). These factors underscore the important role of
procedural protections, like Rule 7(c)(2), with respect to criminal forfeiture.
190 The en banc Fifth Circuit in Martino expressly noted that there was no occasion
there for the court to address the possible ramifications of its decision on the requisite
degree of particularity in the indictment: "Questions regarding the specificity required
in the indictment in order to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(2)
and the extent to which tracing principles apply in satisfying that requirement are not
before us." Martino, 681 F.2d at 961 n.31.
191 See Weiner, supra note 15, at 248 n.88. One commentator has identified common
techniques in such efforts, which include examination of public records, utilization of
IRS information, grand jury subpeonas of corporate records, examination of local land
transfer indexes, electronic surveillance, daily mail covers, subpoenas of telephone
records, and the use of informants. See Magarity, RICO Investigations: A Case Study, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 367, 375-77 (1980).
192 Restitutionary principles provide established legal rules governing the tracing of
fungible cash, for example, where it has heen commingled with other cash. See RESTATE-
MENT OF REsTrrTToN §§ 211-15 (1937). One method to legally reach property so
traced involves a constructive trust, which imposes, on unjust enrichment grounds, an
equitable duty on the holder of title to property to convey it to another. See id. at § 160.
An equitable lien allows one to reach property as security for a claim, also on unjust
enrichment grounds. Id. at § 202.
193 The issue as to whether the government has an obligation to trace profits and
proceeds into their current form was expressly left unresolved in Martino because it
went "to collectibility and related procedures and not to the type of interests forfeitable
under § 1963(a)(1)" and because the parties had not briefed the issue. 681 F.2d at 961.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The Martino court delegated the determina-
tion in the first instance to the district court. 681 F.2d at 961. The government in Mar-
tino claimed that it had no statutory or constitutional duty to trace the insurance
proceeds into their current form. Id. at 961 & n.32. The government equated the mon-
etary forfeiture order with an ordinary money judgment, "permitting it to satisfy the
judgment from any of the defendants' current assets." Id. at 961 (footnote omitted).
Despite its noncommital stance, the Martino court did observe that commentators had
suggested the application of normal restitution principles, such as the theories of con-
structive trust and equitable lien, to trace forfeitable property that has changed form.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Weiner, supra note 15, at 242 ("Tracing of the defend-
ant's property into bank accounts and other places should be permitted so long as the




forfeiture that implicates the rights of third parties, a question that
courts increasingly will encounter given Russello's expansion of the
range of forfeitable interests under RICO. 194 The possibility of re-
lation back of forfeitable interests to the time of the offense is an-
other concept, related to both tracing and to the protection of third
parties, that likely will be the focus of some judicial debate in light of
Russello's inclusion of money as a forfeitable interest.'9 5 Finally,
lower courts necessarily must address the effect of forfeiture of prof-
its and proceeds on provisional equitable remedies, such as re-
straining orders, performance bonds, receiverships, or "other
actions," that are within the jurisdictional power of district courts
handling RICO cases. 196 Although Russello should not impact on
194 Section 1963(c) provides both that "the court shall authorize the Attorney General
to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such
terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper," and that the "United States shall
dispose of all such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision for
the rights of innocent persons." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982). See supra note 7 (text
§ 1963). RICO does not define "innocent persons."
Traditional civil forfeiture proceedings admitted of no right of innocent persons to
assert any claims if a particular forfeiture affected their interests. See Weiner, supra note
15, at 257. In the customs law, Congress as a matter of legislative discretion provided
for a person with an interest in seized property to petition for cancellation. Id. at 257-58
(citing 19 U.S.C. § 1618). RICO employs the practice under the customs laws, where
not inconsistent with its specific provisions, as a referent. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c)
(1982). In a criminal context, however, depriving third parties of title to property with-
out an opportunity to be heard may raise due process considerations. See Taylor, supra
note 34, at 396. Taylor has identified a number of questions that he indicates must be
faced by a court should it allow a third party, alleging an interest in property ordered
forfeited by a jury, to participate in post-trial proceedings: "Who has the burden of
proof? What weight, if any, is the jury's verdict to be given? What standard of proof is
to be applied: the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence or the criminal stan-
dard of beyond a reasonable doubt?" Id. at 396 n.l 18. See generally Comment, RICO
Forfeitures and the Rights of Innocent Third Parties, 18 CAL. W.L. REv. 345 (1982).
195 The McManigal court rejected the relation back doctrine in RICO forfeiture cases,
"interpret[ing] the government's right to the property to attach on conviction; or, if the
government can meet its burden of showing a high enough likelihood of conviction to
get a restraining order, then on indictment." McManigal, 708 F.2d at 289 n.6 (citation
omitted). The court noted that relation back in the RICO context could serve only a
punitive, as opposed to remedial, purpose. Id. at 289. Although not addressing the
issue, Russello on its facts affirmed the forfeiture of insurance proceeds, which Russello
received shortly after the § 1962 violation occurred (the predicate offenses were arson
and related actions), even though, assumedly, at least some of the proceeds had been
converted to cash or other form before trial commenced or a restraining order issued.
See Russello, 104 S. Ct. at 304. This fact situation appears, therefore, to cloud the rela-
tion back issue.
196 Section 1963(b) provides district courts with authority to enter restraining orders
or prohibitions, or to take "other actions," such as requiring performance bonds, with
respect to property subject to forfeiture, as they deem proper. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b)
(1982). For full text of § 1963, see supra note 7.
A restraining order potentially can assume great significance in a RICO forfeiture
context involving, for instance, a large amount of cash proceeds. Although a restraining
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the basic principles governing the granting of equitable provisional
remedies, it will clearly enhance the significance, both for the gov-
ernment and for the defendant, of such actions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Russello represents a recogni-
tion of RICO's expansive scope, continuing the Court's broad ap-
proach to interpreting RICO that was first exhibited in Turkette.
Russello is not a surprising decision, despite the body of lower court
case law holding that RICO's forfeiture mechanism does not encom-
pass proceeds or profits of racketeering activity. The Court is cor-
order does not in itself violate due process, see United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723,
724-25 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (issuance of restraining order relating to assets subject to RICO
forfeiture did not constitute pretrial determination of guilt and did not deny defendant
due process); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (re-
straining order on assets subject to potential RICO forfeiture did not deprive defendant
of presumption of innocence), courts may exercise considerable caution in employing a
restraining order in the context of RICO criminal forfeiture. This judicial caution may
be manifested in two ways. First, courts may require a prompt, post-order, seizure hear-
ing. See, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1982) (recogniz-
ing importance of affording prompt hearing once restraining order is issued,
government could not wait until trial to produce adequate grounds for forfeiture to
justify restraining order on encumbrance of corporate assets); see generally Comment,
Criminal Forfeiture and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE and RICO Rackets for
the Government?, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 776 (1983). Contra Blakey, supra note 15, at 316
n.176 (criticizing Spilotro as converting a § 1963(b) hearing into a mini-trial, causing
unnecessary delay and unwisely affording criminal defendants pretrial discovery).
Blakey argues that the indictment itself may be considered sufficient probable cause on
the question of criminal responsibility to justify a restraining order. Id. at 315 n. 176.
He would limit the court to the issue of the "proper terms" of the order. Id. See 18
U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1982). He continues:
RICO grants broad equitable powers. . . . In light of its liberal construction
clause and its legislative history, it ought to be held to authorize temporary re-
straining orders, preliminary injunctions, receiverships, and the full range of ulti-
mate equity relief on the request of the government or private parties, and because
the source of the jurisdiction is statutory, restrictive precedent ought not be held to
narrow the ability of the court to do justice.
Id. at 338 n.217 (citations omitted).
Further evidence of judicial caution is reflected in the heavy burden imposed by
some courts on the government to justify equitable action such as a restraining order.
See, e.g., Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982) (government's burden in obtaining
restraining order is to demonstrate that it is likely to convince jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant is guilty of racketeering and the properties are subject to forfei-
ture); United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488, 490 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (issuance of
restraining order requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the properties
were involved in the violation, that the properties would be subject to forfeiture, and
government has reasonable grounds to believe defendant is likely to make properties
inaccessible to government before end of trial); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp.
237, 240-41 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (brief ex parte restraining order will be continued only if
government establishes in adversary hearing by preponderance of the evidence that de-
fendant is guilty and property subject to forfeiture).
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rect in interpreting Congress' use of differing language in Sections
1963(a)(1) and (a)(2) as attributable to something more than poor
draftsmanship. Given RICO's broad purpose and its equally broad
operative language, the Court was justified in ascribing an expansive
construction to RICO's forfeiture provision. The Russello Court's
reading of the forfeiture provision is consistent with RICO's legisla-
tive history and preserves the effectiveness of RICO's criminal sanc-
tions. The decision does, however, raise some questions with
respect to future application of the forfeiture provision. The
Supreme Court's holding in Russello will require that lower courts
address a number of related issues, such as what other types of
property may constitute forfeitable "interests," the effect of greater
potential criminal liability on existing procedural protections, the
role of traditional restitutionary principles with respect to property
subject to forfeiture, and the use of provisional equitable remedies.
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